Effects of Taxes and Public Infrastructure on Regional Economic Development by Monofali, Abbas H.
THE EFFECTS OF TAXES AND PUBLIC 
INFRASTRUCTURE ON REGIONAL 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
by 
ABBAS H. MONOFALI 
Bachelor of Science 
University of Khartoum 
Khartoum, Sudan 
1980 
Master of Science 
Texas A&M University 
College Station, Texas 
1993 
Submitted to the Faculty of the 
Graduate College of the 
Oklahoma State University 
in Partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for 
· the Degree of 




THE EFFECTS OF TAXES AND PUBLIC 









I would like to express my appreciation to my major advisor, Dr. Mary N. Gade for 
her time, intelligent supervision, constructive guidance, inspiration, friendly and sincere 
advice and encouragement. My sincere appreciation is also to the other members of my 
committee, Dr. Kent W. Olson, Dr. James R. Fain and Dr. Derrill Peel, whose guidance, 
assistance and encouragement are also invaluable. 
I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Joseph M. Jadlow for the financial 
assistantship granted to me during my study program, and the very warm, friendly, great 
and sincere encouragement and support. I am very grateful to Dr. Keith Willett for his 
invaluable advice and support. I owe very much thanks and appreciation to Ruby 
Diamond for her extremely sincere, kind and helpful advice, assistance and 
encouragement. 
I would like to thank Dr. Khoon Koh, Karen Koh, Dr. Amjad Khan and Dr. Massood 
Saffarian for their care, sincere encouragement and support. 
I am very grateful to my mother, for her care, love, patience and encouragement. 
lll 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter ........................................................................................ .'. ........................... : ... Page 
I. IN1RODUCTION ............................................... : .. ; ................................................. 1 
Statement of the Problem' .. · ...................................... · ................................ 1 
Major limitations .. .,, ........... , ........ : ..... ; .................................... 5 
Objectives of the study , .. , .' .,., ... - ........................................................ 8 
Importance of the study ................................................................................. 10 
Organization of the study .................................. : ........ ,,....... .............. ............ 13 
II LIIBRA TURE REVIEW, ...... · ..... · ..... , .......................... , ........ ·. '.,., .................. 14 
Conceptual Framework and Review of Theoretical Literature ........................ 14 
Economic Gr-owth,:and 1Econemic Development, ~-.-.. ~ ............................ 14, 
· - , Neoclassical vs. Regional Ec<momists View ... : ................................... 15 
How infrastructure affects economic development ......... , ............... , .... 17 
How taxes affect firm location ..... ~ ..................................................... 22-
Laissez--:faire :;:,,.,; ... ; ............................. ,,.; .. ;· ....... , ................................ 24 
Optimal levels of infrastructure and taxes ............. ; ............................ 26 
Empirical Review ........................................................................................... 29 
Public Capital .............. ........................ .............................................. 29 
iv 
Taxes ................................................................................................. 46 
III. IBEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ....................................................................... 56 
Underlying Theoretical Model ..................................................................... 56 
How Independent Variables are Related to Growth .................................... 1~ 59 
IV . EMPIRICAL MODEL .................................................................................... _ .. 65 
Specification ........................................................................ '........................... 65 
Data ····························~··············································.-··································· 72 
Estimation Procedures · ............................. : ..................................................... 79 
Regression Equations .. .. ............................................. ............. ......... 79 
Procedure ..... ; ........ , ............................................................................ 82 
Tests ......................................................... , ........................................ 86 
Appendix IV : Summary of Variables ........................................................ 88 
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS· .... , ..........................................................•............. 90 
Infrastructure and Taxes ................................................................................. , 90 
Results ...................................... · ..................................................... 90 
Explanation of coefficient magnitudes ......................................... 97 
What do the results indicate about the relevant tax 
variable? . .. .. .. . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... .. ....... ... . . .. .. .. . . . ... .. . . ... . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 99 
Calculation of the net effects ........................................................... 100 
Cost per jo.b ..... ............ .... .... ...... •.... .......... .. .... ............................... 104 
Other Variables 105 
VI. CONCLUSION ...........................•.................................................................... 109 
V 
Conclusions ...............................•............................ : .................................. 109 
Policy Implications ...................................................................................... 111 
Limitations ............... : .................................................................................. 112 
Research Implications and Further Research .. .. .. ..... .. .. ... . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... .. .. . 114 
REFERENCES : .................................... : ..................................... : ........................... 115 
BIBIOGRAPHY .; ........................................................................... :.................... 123 
APPENDIX A-1 Results ofRegression Equations (1), (2), (4), (6), (8), (9) 
and Versions of(7) Including the Variables 'U', 'grad' 
and. 'transfer' ......... , ............... ;................................................. 125 
. . 
Appendix A-2 Calculation of the Net Effects of Increases in 
Streets/highways and the Tax Increases to 
Finance Them ........................................................................ 136 


















LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
Results of Regression Equation (3) ......................................................... 93 
Results of Regression Equation (5) ......................................................... 94 
Results of Regression Equation (7) ......................................................... 98 
Net Effects of Tax and Public Infrastructure Capital Increases ............ 101 
Cost per Job and Jobs Created for a 0.01 Business Tax Cut ................ 105 
Results of Regression Equation (1 ) ........................................................ 127 
Results of Regression Equation (2) ....................................................... 128 
Results of Regression Equation ( 4) ........... , ............................................ 129 
Results of Regression Equation (6) ........................................................ 130 
Results of Regression Equation (8) ........................................................ 13 l 
Results of Regression Equation (9) ........................................................ 132 
Results of Regression Equation (7) Including the Variable 'u' ............. 133 
Results of Regression Equation (7) Including the Variable 'grad' ........ 134 
Results of Regression Equation (7) Including the Variable 'transfer' ... 135 
Data Table ............................................................................................... 138 
vii 
Statement of the Problem: 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
''The role. of public investment in the economy captivated 
national attention in the early 1990s. Over time, the calls 
for increased public spending became lost in an 
increasingly austere budgetary climate. Nonetheless, the 
issue of the role of the public sector in the provision of 
infrastructure has not. been resolved." (Grihfield and 
McGuire, 1997; p.113) 
The effectiveness of state and local ecorioinic development policies has .been a 
controversial issue for decades. State and local governments implement policies that offer 
incentives. to businesses in an effort to promote economic development. These include 
grants such as land grants, or the right-to-use certain natural resources at below-market 
pn~es,·i~;~in;~cist'ioiriis, tax k~~~ti~~; such as· pfop~rty tax abat~~ents ~a· other 'types 
of tax exemptio~s •. and what Bartik (1991) termed "new wave"· economic development 
policies which encourage innovation and business expansion into export markets. Tax 
incentives can be general or selective tax cuts for businesses in a state or for certain areas 
in a state. 
Ralph Baily (1986) and others argue that state and local ecm;iomic development 
policie$ are a "zero-sum" game for the U.S. economy as a whole. Netzer (1991) argues 
that competition for economic development is a "negative-sum" game for the national 
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U.S. economy in terms of efficient resource allocation until all governments have adopted 
same economic development package, then it would be·a "zero-sum"game. However, the 
discussion under this study is·restricted to the state and local perspective only. 
Even from the state and the local perspective, there has been much disagreement 
among researchers with regard to the effectiveness of state and local economic 
· development policies. Proponents argue that such policies are effective in increasing 
local jobs and promoting local economic development. Critics argue that they are not 
effective and are a waste of resources because their effects are offset by other states 
counter policies. Even if they are effective in creating new jobs, they do not effectively 
benefit ·the local population· because labor moves in from other states· or localities. Tax 
incentives, which are a major component of such policies, are not a major determinant of 
business location decisions. 
The most important point raised recently is that state and local economic 
development policies are very. expensive •to·. state and local governments. Thus, the 
question raised now is not only about the effectiveness of such policies in attracting 
businesses ,and thus .. creating jobs.:to. the state• arid local economies (ignoring .the national 
benefit or loss), but also;, and more important than that, is . whether they do that in a cost-: 
effective manner. 
Let us narrow down the focus and restrict our discussion to the major component 
of economic developmentpolicies, which is tax incentives. The costs of such tax 
incentives are, in essence, foregone public services. One way to examine the cost-
effectiveness of tax incentives then would be by focusing on the costs in terms of public 
services reductions. 
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The recent attention given to pubic infrastructure deterioration has increased the 
interest of policy makers and researchers in the effects of state and local tax and spending 
policies on regional economic growth. Public infrastructure includes non-military non-
residential structures and equipment including transportation facilities , such as streets, 
highways, railroads, canals, airports, and harbors; water and sewer treatment facilities and 
networks; communication systems; and education facilities; D. Dalenberg and R.W. 
Eberts (1988), among others, have discussed the declining state of the nation's public 
infrastructure, specially in mature cities and metropolitan areas. They cited the example 
of the 58-year old Eagle Avenue ramp on the western edge of downtown Cleveland, 
Ohio, as typical of the problem of public infrastructure deterioration and effects on urban 
development. They outlined that the. ramp was unsafe and without considerable repair 
would have to be closed. Closing it would limit access to the surrounding industrial 
region, increas.e the cost of doing business in the area and possibly lead to the flight out of 
businesses. They explained that the case of the Eagle A venue ramp is just an example of 
thousands of roads, bridges and other public infrastructure that are in similar condition. 
Mor:eover, they found that , in Cleveland; every dollar spent on ;public infrastructure is: 
needed just to maintain the public capital stock at its current level. They found that the 
situation is similar in Chicago and that the trend is increasing for both the Midwest and 
the U.S. as a whole. 
It has· been suggested that the condition of a locality's. public infrastructure might 
affect economic development in the surrounding area. It may increase the cost of 
businesses, decrease the attractiveness of the area to firms that are looking to migrate into 
the area, and cause existing firms to move out. 
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So, the question is whether the impact of public infrastructure capital stock is 
statistically significant for economic growth. Absolute calculations of expenditures on 
public infrastructure maintenance and replacement are very meaningful and direct. But 
the relative significance of these expenditures is more important since it considers the 
relative magnitude of the need for maintaining or increasing the stock and considers other 
factors that determine ·ecOJ1omic growth and in turn the public capital stock itself. · 
Earlier studies that estimate the effects . of public capital on state and local 
economic growth .used -government spending flows on public infrastructure, or the 
. .. 
number of gpvemment employees, as proxies for public infrastructure capital stocks. 
Therefore, they were not able· to estimate such effects directly. The reason is that there 
were ho data available on the stocks of public infrastructure capital for the state or local 
levels. In a project for the National Science Foundation, R.W. Eberts, C.S. Park and D. 
Dalenberg (May 1986) have _estimated the components of public capital stock for 38 
metropolitan areas.from .1958 to198l:using the_perpetual inventory method. Randall W. 
Eberts (Dec 1986) made the first attempt to use such data to estimate the contribution of 
urban public0 infrastructure to regi,Ci>na:l manufacturing production. Public capital stock was 
entered as an input into a translog production function. The production function estimates 
show, amqJ;!,g_.other tltjJ:],gs, that public capital stock makes a positive and significant 
contribution to the manufacturing . output in · the sample of 38 SMSA's · (Standard 
· Metropolitan Statistical· Areas). Aschauer's (,1989; empirical results indicate . that 
· nonmilitary public capital · stock is dramatically more important in determining 
productivity than either the flow of nonmilitary or military spending. His study was for 
the national level, not the state and local level. Alicia Munnell (1990a) constructed 
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estimates of public and private capital stocks for the state level and used that data in 
examining the relationship between public capital investment and private economic 
activity. She found that public capital enhances the productivity of private capital and that 
it has a positive and statistically significant impact on private sector output. Holtz-Eakin 
(1993) constructed estimates of public capital stocks for the state level. A bulk of 
research then followed using state and local public capital stock estimates.to investigate 
whether public. capital stock has a significant effect on productivity and growth. This has 
raised the concern about the deterioration of public infrastructure and triggered the rise in 
the interest of policy makers and researchers in the issue of the effects of state and local 
tax and spending policies on regional economic growth. 
Major limitations: 
There are some major limitations of previous studies that motivated this current study: 
1. Most of the bulk of research just referred to, i.e. the research that used state and 
local public. capital stock estimates, has been on the effect of public capital stock on 
manufacturing productivity using· the framework of the neoclassical production function. 
Therefore; these· studies, with very. few, and, limited exceptions, confined to investigating 
the significance of public capital stock in aggregate. But there are different types of public 
. capital sJo.c~:: Th~s, the results regarding the significance of public capital are averages 
across types that are likely to differ in significance and signs. Therefore, when public 
capital stock is dis-aggregated to types, its significance might differ. Few studies, as shall 
be discussed below, have considered this but with some limitations. 
Besides, there is a possible specification problem, as explained in more detail in 
chapter II , when entering total public capital stock estimates in the aggregate production 
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function the same way private capital is entered, explicitly or implicitly assuming .that, in 
terms of Meade's (1952) classification, all public capital is 'unpaid input' and not 
'atmosphere' type. A proper treatment could have been achieved by estimating the 
'atmosphere-type' portion of public capital stock and entering it in a way similar to the 
way technology level is entered in the production function. 
2. Such studies investigate the significance of public capital in isolation of state and local 
tax and spending policies. This is partly because the majority of the studies using new 
data, i.e. state and local public capital stock estimates, adopted the framework of the 
neoclassical production function. Regardless of being able to determine whetherincreases 
in public capital stock are significant or not, that cannot by itself answer the question of 
whether the positive effects, on growth, of public capital stock increases would be smaller 
or larger than the negative effects of tax increases to finance such capital stock increases. 
Lynch (1996) and Bartik (1996) have explained that the benefits of greater public· services 
must be compared with the costs of higher taxes. In other words, even if increases in 
state and local public capital stocks have positive and statistically significant effects on 
economic growth, such positive effects should be compared with the negative effects of 
the tax increases to finance such public capital stock increases. The estimates of these tax 
effects also might differ significantly when public capital stock is disaggregated. This has 
not been addressed by previous research. 
3. Studies of the determinants of firm location can include the effects of taxes. However, 
most of the previous firm location studies have used public capital spending amounts or 
the number of government employees as proxies for public capital stocks. The evidence 
by Eberts (1986), Aschauer (1989), and others indicates that public capital stock 
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variables have more explanatory power than public capital outlays. Hence, it seems 
appropriate to consider using state and local public infrastructure capital stock estimates 
in the framework of the firm location models. 
4. Holtz-Eakin (1992) and Bartik (1996) argue that most previous studies of productivity 
levels or growth failed to control for · fixed effects of state or regional unobserved 
characteristics and that such failure constitutes one of the reasons of the lack of consensus 
among researchers on the effects of public capital stock on state and local economic 
growth. 
5. As far as the author of this current study knows, all of the studies that have controlled 
for state or regional unobserved characteristics have assumed that such characteristics can 
be controlled for by introducing dummy variables for differences in intercept parameters 
assuming that the slope parameters are the same across states and regions. In other words, 
they assume that state and local economic growth can be estimated by one equation for all 
the states. Therefore, their results constitute averages of the effects of policies across all 
the states. It seems misleading to conclude on the basis of the sign or magnitude of such 
averages that increasing, or decreasing, taxes would benefit the nation, or in other words 
"what is good ,e.g., for New York is good for Oklahoma". This constitutes a reason to 
suspect structural stability of the regression model even after controlling for fixed effects 
by dummy variables for intercept changes across states or regions. 
6. Most studies that considered the effects of state and local public infrastructure capital 
and taxes on state and local economic growth have used total state and local taxes as their 
tax variable. Some studies considered certain types of taxes, such as property taxes, sales 
taxes, etc. Olson (1990) has indicated that it is the total tax bill that is relevant, not 
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individual types of taxes, such as property tax alone. This directly suggests that it is a 
total business tax bill that might matter. His study also suggests that the tax bill paid by 
individuals might also be a relevant tax variable since it might be of interest to upper-
level managers who make location decisions. So, it might be the case that firms, when 
considering locational decisions, 'look at' taxes paid by businesses and not just total state 
and local taxes or single types of taxes. If so, then the appropriate variable to include in a 
model for estimating the effects of state and local infrastructure capital and taxes on 
economic growth based on firm location decisions would be a measure of business taxes. 
It might as well be the case that taxes paid by individuals, i.e. non-business taxes, are an 
important factor because they might affect the cost of labor and local demand for 
· products, and because firm owners or top management who make location decisions do 
look at taxes paid by individuals because they affect their own incomes and thus their 
well being. Therefore, it seems reasonable to consider a measure of business taxes as well 
as a measure of taxes paid by individuals in the model for estimating the effect of state 
and local public infrastructure capital and taxes on state and local economic development. 
This study is m ·attemphO accomplish that goal~'···· .. · · 
Objectives of the study: 
The general objective of this study is to provide more evidence on the effects of 
taxes and public infrastructure on regional economic growthin a way to check, shed light 
on, and correct for the factors that might have contributed to the lack of consensus among 
researchers in this issue. The specific objective is: to estimate the effects of state and 
. local taxes and public infrastructure capital, using the recently constructed state and local 
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public capital stock data, in a framework that combines both of these variables since 
considering them in isolation of each other is not much meaningful as outlined above. 
This objective would be accomplished by using a cross-sectional multiple regression 
model with employment growth rate as a dependent variable and public infrastructure 
capital and taxes as explanatory variables, with other variables, within the context of a 
firm location model. 
The studies that considered breaking down public capital s,tock figures into types 
are very few, notably by Eisner (1991), and in the framework of the neoclassical 
production function, i.e. not including taxes or other factors. Alicia Munnell (1990a) has 
included both taxes and new data of public capital stock variables in a model ( of 13 
observations only) but with public capital as a total, not disaggregated to, types. Eberts 
(1989) did the same thing using total public capital stock. So, within the studies that have 
used the recently generated state and local public capital stock data, the ones that have 
considered disaggregates/types of public capital stock have not included taxes, and the 
ones that have included taxes have not considered the types of public capital. 
This study wmtlcl consider total as well' 'as ',type~ bf 'public 'capital. This would be 
accomplished by using the framework of a firm location model as mentioned above. To 
avoid the estimation problems of previous researchers, this study would control for 
regional and unobserved or unmeasured fixed effects. This would be accomplished by 
introducing intercept dummy,variables for regions. So, estimation would be done with a 
fixed effects model (FEM). In addition to that, this research study will also investigate the 
structural stability of the regression model used to estimate the effects of public 
infrastructure and taxes on state and local economic development even after controlling 
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for regional unobserved characteristics. The purpose of this is to check whether the slope 
parameters are the same across all states. 
It also seems important to consider business vs. non-business taxes since it might 
be the case that when making location decisions, firms do not just look at the state and 
local total tax revenues. This would be accomplished by introducing a measure of each of 
these two categories of taxes, as explained in Chapter III (Empirical Model), and 
including them as the tax variables in the model. 
Importance of the Study: 
The significance of this study can be outlined as follows: 
• There is lack of consensus between previous research results on the impact of state 
and local infrastructure capital stocks and taxes on state and local economic 
development. This study is an endeavor to provide more evidence on the relationship 
between state and local public capital stocks and taxes and regional economic 
development. 
• Most of the previous research on the effects of state and local public infrastructure 
capital used public capital outlays , or the numbers of government employees, as 
proxies for public capital stocks. This study uses state and local public capital stock 
estimates, a newly constructed data, to directly estimate the relationship between state 
and local public capital stocks and regional economic growth. 
• The research that uses state and local public capital stock estimates and considers the 
effects of taxes together with those of public infrastructure capital stocks on regional 
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economic growth is scant. One of the objectives of this study is to combine both 
public capital and tax variables in estimation of the relationship between regional 
economic growth and such tax variables. 
• This study does not consider state and local public capital stocks as total only, but 
also considers types of public capital to avoid averaging the effects across types of 
public capital. 
• The econometric model constructed for the purpose of this study includes controls for 
regional unobserved or unmeasured fixed effects. 
• Another contribution of this study is testing the structural stability of the regression 
model used to estimate the relationship between· state and local public capital stocks 
and taxes and state and local economic development. Testing structural stability of a 
regression model can be done by either formal tests, like the Chow test, or the 
statistical significance of slope dummy variables. Previous studies have assumed that 
all regional and state unobserved or unmeasured characteristics and effects can be 
thrown in the intercept of the "6stimation equation,· assuining that all slope parameters 
are equal across all states. 
• Another important contribution of this study is that it uses, as tax variables, a measure 
of business taxes and a measure of non-business taxes, since when considering 
location decisions, firms might not just 'look at' state total tax revenue or just types of 
taxes. 
• The typical measure of welfare used in previous research is total welfare amount. The 
variable 'transfer' used in this study is calculated in a manner different from previous 
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studies to include only the amounts paid by the state, not the federal share which is 
considered as exogenous from the individual state's perspective, specially when 
modeling in the context of a firm location model. 
• Almost all of the studies that used state and local public capital stock data in 
estimating the impacts of state and local public capital stocks on economic 
development at the state level have used Alicia Munnell's (1990) estimates. This 
point is discussed in more detail in chapters IV and V. This current study uses 
Holtz-Eakin's (1993) data and not Munnell's data. 
• With regard to policy implications, whenever the issue is vital, such as the issue of 
development, and the costs are substantial, more evidence is demanded especially 
if existing evidence is mixed and/or scant. This is the case of the situation under 
discussion. Providing more evidence on the relationship between state and local 
economic development and state and local infrastructure capital stocks and, also, 
taxes helps to resolve the problem of the lack of consensus among researchers and 
thus helps policy makers decide "on which buttons to put their hands." 
It is useful for policy makers to have evidence that suggests to them what types of 
public capital are more effective for regional economic development and for which 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, it is important for policy makers to have evidence with 
regard to which taxes, for generating a certain amount of revenue, create less of a 
disincentive for employment growth, the ones that are paid by businesses or the 
ones that are paid by nonbusinesses. 
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Organization of the Study: 
The study is organized into six chapters. Chapter I is an introduction and a statement of 
the problem. Here the problem is elaborately stated and the objectives of the study are 
mentioned. Chapter II deals with the conceptual framework and literature review. Chapter 
ID contains the underlying theoretical model and its specification. Chapter N is devoted 
to empirical model identification . Chapter V summarizes the results and analysis. 
Chapter VI pre~~nts conclusions from the prese~t study and outlines the potential policy 
implications, limitations of the study, and further research. 




Conceptual Framework and Review of Theoretical Literature: 
Economic growth and economic development: 
Economic growth, a major goal of economic policy and societies, is said to occur 
when real per capita income increas.es over a period of time, usually a year. In other 
words, economic growth occur~ when society's output increases more rapidly than its 
population. Economic growth usually implies a higher standard of living. 
The term 'economic development' is conceived of as implying secular increases 
in per capita real income, just as the term 'economic growth' implies, but in addition to 
that as involving changes in the structures of prodllctj9µ, cultures, laws and institutions, 
,. , •, , • ' ;_'it I -".i; !_ L , ·• i • ' ... • ' 1 '. ·- ~ .'.._ ~ - _ - f.J_ l ~; ;_' . . , 
and income distribution. Usually the term economic development is used to describe 
economies of less developed cou11tries when they undergo long-run increases in per capita 
income. Such increases of per· capita income are associated with considerable structural 
change as mentioned above .. Long run increases in per capita income in. a developed 
country do not involve considerable structural change of society and institutions, and thus 
is described as economic growth. However, the definition of economic development 
under our current study is not exactly the same as of the term economic development 
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when associated with less developed countries. There is, except in economically 
distressed regions, no substantial structural change of societies or institutions involved. 
So the term is used to distinguish the economies of less grown states or regions from 
those of fully grown ones. All, of course, are within the U.S, which is a developed 
country, in which the less developed states are converging in their levels of growth (per 
capita income) to the national average. 
Neoclassical vs. Regional economists view: 
Traditional neoclassical economics is based on the assumptions of perfect 
markets, perfect flexibility of price adjustments, long-run market-clearing, rationality of 
agents whose behaviors are governed by decisions of marginal optimization of utility and 
profits. The traditional neoclassical view of regional economic development is based on 
the idea of the mechanism of equalization between the value of marginal product of the 
input unit with the market price of the input unit, which is theoretically sound but, 
assuming perfect mobility of inputs and a ubiquitous.world. 
Robock (1966), Dubey (1964) and other regional economists, argue that the 
economic ,growth factors of ,resourc.es, human skills, and access to markets. are not evenly 
distributed among the regions of a nation. 
"Human activity and its concomitants occupy space. Resources, 
markets, products are not located at mythical point-; having no 
lengths and breadths. There is a spatial separation. Resources and 
their production and consumption are not evenly distributed over 
space". (Dubey, 1964, p 28):" 
Further, regional economists argue that the mobility of inputs is not perfect or without 
frictions, and the locations of economic activity are not homogeneous. Therefore, they 
argue that it is vital to give sufficient weight to the effects of public fiscal spending on 
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private investment decisions, and vice versa. For reasons not to be count here, but anyone 
can simply think of, at least a minimum level of balanced growth is vital for the growth of 
a whole nation's economy. However, there are always certain regions to which private 
investment might not flow unless some public infrastructure investment is made at least 
above the national or regional average and/or some public services or incentives are 
provided in a way to decrease the comparative costs of private production in such regions. 
That is to say, unbalanced provision of public services is necessary for balanced growth to 
occur, or for-at least a minimum level of growth to occur in some regions. This explains 
the importance of state and local tax and spending policies for balanced regional 
economic growth. 
On the other hand, the development of regions or localities that are less developed 
might better be 'pushed' by creating agglomeration centers within the region. fu other 
words, an unbalanced growth approach might well benefit development of regions within 
a state. Perroux (1955) has asserted that: 
"growth does not appear everywhere at the same time; it becomes 
manifest _at points _on poles of _growth, with _va.ijable intensity; it 
spreads. th~ougb. -· different channels, with variable terminal effects 
on the whole of the economy" (p.94). 
Hirschman (1958) has stressed concentration of investment strategies on a few sectors 
instead of wide dispersion of projects. This unbalanced growth notion, together with the 
argument that the mobility of private capital is not perfect or without frictions explains 
the significance that state and local tax and spending policies might have on regional 
economic development. 
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How infrastructure affects firm location : 
Among the public services that might affect regional growth are public 
infrastructure quantity and quality in a region. How does public infrastructure affect the 
production decisions of a firm? 
A good is said to be excludable if people can be· excluded from consuming it 
when they do not pay for it. A good is rival if one person's consumption of it reduces the 
amount available to others. Private goods are both rival and excludable. Those who do 
not pay the price are excluded. A pure public good is one that is not excludable and non-
rival. A public good that is rival, e.g. is subject to congestion, although still not 
excludable, is not a pure public good. Some examples of public goods are national 
defense, police, highways, and so on. Like private goods and services, public goods and 
services can be used by consumers as consumer goods, or by producers as inputs used in 
production. 
An extemality is said to·exist if the production by one firm affects the production 
of another firm in a manner not accounted for by the market. (Let us restric.t the 
discuss1011 'here lei production, although the sfune can be said about utility). Ex.temaliti~~ 
can be positive or negative. 
Meade (1952) has distinguished between two types of external economies or 
diseconomies. He calls the first type "unpaid factors of production" and the second the 
"creation of atmosphere." Viewed in this premise, public infrastructure can affect a firm's 
profitability via both channels. As an unpaid factor of production, public infrastructure is 
used by private firms as an input and since it is a public good they do not pay a market 
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price for it. As an atmospheric factor, public infrastructure enhances the productivity of 
the private factors of production. 
Dalenberg (1987) and Eberts (1990) have explained Meade's (1952) classification 
and suggest that "atmosphere public goods' fit into the pure public inputs type. Thus, they 
are characterized as being non-rival. Entrance of new firms would not affect the other 
existing firms ability to take advantage of the public inputs. The other type of public 
inputs classified as 'unpaid factors' of production are rival and thus are not pure public 
I 
goods. Entrance of more and more new firms in the area would result in crowded streets, 
and thus affect usage by other existing firms. 
Almost all of the studies that included public infrastructure capital stock estimates 
into the neoclassical production function to estimate the impact of public infrastructure 
capital stocks on private productivity growth, output growth, or employment growth have 
explicitly or, mostly, implicitly assumed that public capital is an 'unpaid factor' of 
production, i.e. the second type of Meade's classification. That is, it is not a pure public 
good since it is rival, e.g. streets and local services are subject to congestion. 
- .. 
Because it is an 'unpaid factor', it is just entered into the aggregate production 
function the same way .private capital is entered. Although that makes the task of 
-- •... . . -~ - . 
modeling simple and easy, it implies a specification problem. Not all public capital is an 
'unpaid factor', some is 'atmosphere' and thus not a pure public good. Even local public 
infrastructure capital is not all subject to congestion. In fact, a considerable portion of 
public capital is directly 'atmosphere' type, such as fire protection, defense, police, 
research and technology, education, etc. Local business development centers, technology 
centers, .. etc. are not excludable and non-rival. They are thus 'atmosphere' public goods 
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also. What is important is that much of this type of public capital is used by businesses 
and it augments the productivity of private inputs. This implies that this 'atmosphere'type 
has to be entered into the aggregate production function in a way similar to the 
technology parameter included in the production function, and not the way private capital 
is entered. This, then, implies partitioning total public capital estimates into two parts. 
One part is 'atmosphere' type of public capital , i.e. the one that augments the 
productivity of private inputs, and the other part is the 'unpaid input' type. The first is to 
be entered in the aggregate production function the same way the technology parameter is 
entered. The second one is to be entered the usual way private capital is entered. Hulton 
and Schwab (1991) have .built a formulation of an aggregate prnduction function that is 
based on Meade's classification and embodied both of the two types of public capital 
entered separately into the production function, the 'environmental' type as a shift 
parameter and the 'unpaid factor' entered in a way similar to private. capital. In fact, the 
above discussion on the possible specification problem that growth models, that entered 
total public capital stock in an aggregate production function, might have run into, is 
based on and triggered byth~ above referenced Hulton and Schwab specification. 
Hansen (1965) developed a comprehensive theory on the potential impact of 
infrastructure investment on regional development. He divides OC ( overhead capital) into 
two components: SOC (social overhead capital) and EOC (economic overhead capital). 
EOC is aimed- at supporting directly productive activities, and includes roads, bridges, 
harbors, power plants, and similar facilities. SOC is aimed at investment in human 
beings. 
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Hansen then hypothesized that the effectiveness of infrastructure investment 
depends on the type of infrastructure and the type of region in which it is implemented. 
He has classified regions into three types: congested, intermediate, - and lagging. 
Congested regions are characterized by very high concentrations of population, industrial 
and commercial activities and public infrastructure. In th~se regions, the marginal social 
benefit from an expansion of economic activity would be less than the marginal social 
cost because external disec.onomies resulting from such expansion would outweigh the 
external economies resulting from it. 
"Intermediate regions, on the other hand, are those which offer 
significant advantages - raw materials, qualified labor, cheap 
power, etc. - to private firms, and where entry. of new firms or 
expansion of .existing firms would result · in marginal external 
economies substantially in excess of concomitant social costs. In 
other words, other things being equal (except the degree of 
concentration) the marginal social product to cost ratio would be 
greater in these areas than in congested regions" (Hansen, 1965, 
p.6) 
Lagging regions are characterized by small-scale agriculture or stagnant or 
Qe~lin~~& i,n,9.us¢e,s, .. lmy ~~dards_ ~f living and relatively deficient in SOC and thus they· 
,~ .. ._.: ." l l l \.ii~.- .: : • . : ' , . :.:_ '·. • i ... :_ I 't ! I_;, , " "~ \,; • · 
present few, if any, 3:ttrib11tes to_ at~ct new firms. Thus concentrating EOC in lagging 
regions would not be the right strategy since such regions do not have comparative 
advantages as compared '11v'ith intermediate regions. 
Based on these characteri~tics of the three types of. regions, Hansen hypothesizes 
' ' t ·, ' • . : .: •• ~ i • 
that the best strategy is to aim EOC at intermediate regions. They are the regions that are 
relatively deficient in EOC only. It is not economically rational to direct excess EOC to 
lagging regions. However, his conclusion regarding SOC is that it is anticipated to give 
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better outcomes if SOC is concentrated in lagging regions, rather than intermediate or 
congested regions. 
The above scenario is applicable for the initial situation where public investment 
is first introduced. As more concentration of EOC occurs in intermediate regions, the 
marginal need for SOC rises in intermediate regions. The opposite occurs in lagging 
regions. As intermediate regions reach optimal concentration mix, public policy then 
switches to balanced growth. 
The above discussion shows how state and local public spending policies can 
affect the state and/or local economy by providing public infrastructure capital. 
Investment in public capital affects the supply side of the economy through increasing the 
productivity of private inputs, as well as through decreasing costs to firms since public 
capital services can also be considered by firms as 'unpaid inputs'. Such potential impact 
on the supply side is not only through increases in productivity of private capital, but also 
through expansion of industries due to the entrance of new firms being attracted by the 
enhanced amenities in the area, as well as the establishment of firm branches and 
increases. of scale of existing businesses. 
On the demand side, public expenditure, one of the tools of fiscal policy, has the 
potential effect of increasing aggregate demand since it increases household income. 
Public spending is expected to have a multiplier effect. Increased public spending is thus 
a means to stimulate the economy of the region or locality. It has the potential of 
increasing employment and output. In contrast to supply-side effects, the demand-side 
effects on a state or local economy from public spending are likely to occur more quickly. 
However, as reported by Bartik (1996), active government policy to manipulate the 
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demand side of a state or local economy is seen by most economists as having limited 
benefit because much of the purchasing power resulting from such policy would "leak 
out" of the state or local economy since firms and households would spend considerable 
portions of the increments to their purchasing power on purchases from outside the state 
or local economy. Besides, most of the public services increases are funded by higher 
taxes, or borrowing, dampening or crowding out purchasing power, which decreases the 
mentioned demand-side effect. 
Thus, the aforementioned theories indicate that private investment location and 
expansion decisions, and household location decisions, could be affected by the provision 
of public infrastructure and other public services. These factors increase the attractiveness 
of a region or a locality to businesses. Even further, when more businesses are attracted, 
external economies of agglomeration can be enjoyed by the region. This is why, as 
outlined by Bartik (1996): 
"spending increases and tax cuts are often advanced by state and 
local governments under the ratipnale that they would bring 
significant and collateral benefits for jobs and the economy over 
and above their specific benefits". (p.3) 
How taxes affect firm location : 
Taxes are exogenous to firms, i.e. firms have no direct control on the amounts of 
taxes levied on them. Most public services, such as public infrastructure, are financed to a 
considerable extent by taxes, some of which are levied on businesses. But both taxes and 
public services are controlled /provided by government. So, taxes cannot be considered as 
prices of public services in the usual sense of prices. Firms look at taxes as costs. Thus, 
state and local taxes can affect business costs and thus affect business location and 
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production decisions, which in tum affect the state or local economy. Of course taxes 
have more of an effect at the margin. Firms compare business tax costs across states, the 
thing which has heightened the interstate tax competition for businesses. Several 
meaSures of state and local business taxes have shown considerable interstate differences. 
. . 
Wheaton (1983) h~ reported considerable interstate variations in business tax levels. 
There are several factor~ that need to be considered when we say firms look at interstate 
business tax· differentials. Beyond the ·nominal· magnitudes of such tax differentials there 
is tax deductibility. There are ample soll!Ces of information about tax deductibility thatis 
available to firms. Deductibility reduces the magnitudes of interstate tax differentials. 
Another factor is the backward or forward shiftability .. of taxes imposed on businesses. 
This might be partially estimated by firms, but it is in general not readily known by firms 
before moving into an area. Also, whether or not taxes are matched by public services 
would affect the magnitude of interstate business tax differences fi:om a firm perspective, 
if firms know the magnitudes and quantities of such services. 
Thus, firms consider business taxes as costs. Firms also might consider other 
'taxes,' Le. non-business taxes, when they consider locational decisions. Individual income 
_taxes~it in'genera1:'ia:xbs'tii~{are''paicf"by individuals .might affect labor availability. 
quality, local. demand for goods and .services. etc. They might as well be considered by 
·owners· of :Small fiirtis or; location decision makers of large firms since they affect their 
mcomes; -
The effects of interstate or inter-jurisdictional tax differentials on firm location 
decisions are subject to several other factors, such as whether such differentials rank high 
or low relative to the other vari~bles that affect firm location decisions. This implies the 
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need for empirical research. 
The effectiveness of a state's "business climate," - a term that mainly refers to 
factors such as state and local · taxes, laws, and labor unionization - has been a 
controversial issue. Bartik (1991) describes the effect of taxes on state and local business 
growth as the most controversial issue in economic development policy and that the 
resolution of such controversy can affect the entire design of state and local tax systems. 
"Laissez-faire": 
Adam Smith, as·well as the other liberals and opponents of mercantilism, came to 
adopt 'laissez-faire', i.e. free trade or maximal level of non-interference of government in 
the free-course of economic activity. Smith believed that the human being is a creature· of 
self-interest. He believed in the natural harmony between individual and public interests. 
Therefore, he considered government intervention as an evil. Government should mainly 
protect property rights, enforce the law and only handle those services such as postal 
service, insurance, and banking, over which there was no controversy as to whether they 
be handled bythe·govemment or not. ' . '.] ';. '' . ; ''. '. ,·. ', ·, 
·Bentham,· however, did not believe in an unlimited natural harmony between 
individ1Jal and public interest. Therefore, he deemed government intervention as 
necessary in instances where:there is conflict between individual and public interests; in 
order to enforce protection-Of public interests. 
J.S. Mill believed in self-interest as a drive for human behavior and believed in 
'laissez-faire' but, following Bentham, he believed that there are limits to 'laissez-faire'. 
He cited, in his "Principles of Political Economy'', many exceptions to the doctrine that 
24 
"individuals are the best judges of their own interests", and following Bentham, he did 
not believe that there is always natural harmony between individual and public interests: 
" a certain line of conduct is for the general interest does not 
always make it people's individual interest to adhere to that line of 
conduct" (J.S. Mill, p.966) 
Thus, he deemed government intervention as, in some instances, necessary. 
Beside the very basic functions of government, J.S. Mill has indicated various 
exceptions to the . maxim that individuals are the best judges of their own interests, 
including public infrastructure and public services such as research. 
"There are many scientific researches, of great value to a nation 
and to mankind, requiring assiduous devotion of time and labor, 
and not infrequently great expense, by persons who can obtain a 
high price for their services in other ways. If the government had 
no power to grant indemnity for expense, and remuneration for 
time and labor thus employed, such researches could only be 
undertaken by the very few persons who, with an independent 
fortune, unite technical knowledge, laborious habits, and either 
great public spirit, or an ardeni desire of scientific celebrity" (J.S. 
Mill, p.996) 
However, it should be noted that, Mill has rigorously stressed that government should 
first check whether that task can be done by private undertaking and, if so, whether or not 
that private performance of the task would be better than the government handling of it. 
He emphasized that practical experience proves that: 
"in all the more advanced communities, the great majority of 
things are worse done by the intervention of government, than the 
individuals most interested in the matter would do them, or cause 
them to be done, if left to themselves. The grounds of this truth are 
expressed with tolerable exactness in the popular dictum, that 
people understand their own business and their own interests 
better, and care for them more, than the government does, or can be 
expected to do. This maxim holds true throughout the greatest part 
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of the business of life and wherever it is true we ought to condemn 
every kind of government intervention that conflicts with it".(J.S. 
Mill, p.947) 
So, Mill strongly maintained that government intervention should be restricted to only the 
situations where it is · necessary, and even when it is necessary it should be kept to its 
·minimum. 
"Laissez-faire, in short, should be the. general _practice: every 
departure from.. it, unless required by some great goods, is a 
certain evil" (J.S. Mill, .p:960) 
So, government intervention should be seen as. a restricted exception to the doctrine that 
individuals are the -best judges -of their own interests. Beside the prjm.ary functions of 
government; government interventi,on is justifiable only where it deems necessary to . . . . . 
correct for market_, .failure, suc4 as . the cases ,of public goods, externalities, natural 
monopolies and inform.ation asymmetries. This implies that it is justifiable to the extent 
of the existence of such market _ failure(s), and beyond that it is detrimental to the 
econoqiy.'.1 , !' .... ·. t.'. :: .:. : ·.·, .[,. . · .. :• :. ! '.' : l . , .. ; , • · •. , ~ ·• J_i_ I , 
·Optimal. levels of infrastructure .and tilx:es: 
The above. discussion places the question as to what is that minimum level of 
governmentinterventj.0J;1.~t:i_sju~tifiable--and:would not harm the economy and society's 
well being. , This leads. us -to t4~. question:. what is .the. optimal level of public. goods and 
services, or, some,what narrowly, what. is the optimum level of. public infrastructure 
capital stock and the optimum level (and mix) of taxes? 
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Economic efficiency, or Pareto efficiency or optimality, is satisfied in an economy 
if it is not possible to make someone better off without making someone else worse off. 
The condition for economic efficiency is that marginal social cost equals marginal social 
benefit. This condition satisfies Pareto efficiency because under the equality of marginal 
social cost and marginal social benefit it is not possible to make someone better off 
without making someone else worse off. It can be shown that if there are no externalities, 
perfectly competitive markets satisfy Pareto efficiency. 
An externality is said to exist when the consumption or production actions of one 
agent affect the utility or production of another agent(s) via some way rather than the 
market price. Then marginal social benefit would not be equal to marginal social cost. 
Therefore, the presence of an externality causes the market outcome to be not efficient. 
Perfectly competitive markets fail to satisfy Pareto efficiency condition under the 
presence of externalities. In many situations of externalities, government intervention can 
work towards optimal outcomes. 
So, externalities and public goods are two cases where competitive markets fail to 
satisfy the condition for economic efficiency,'· and where government intervention can 
improve efficiency and can lead to higher levels of welfare. Government can design 
mechanisms and /or directly interfere to decrease the supply of negative externalities, and 
increase the supply of positive externalities (where public goods themselves can be 
considered as creating positive externalities). 
How can the government provide the optimum level of public goods ? The 
condition for efficient provision of public goods is that marginal social cost, including all 
costs to society, equals the sum of individuals' marginal benefits ( Samuelson rule). There 
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are in general three channels of intervention in this regard: direct provision of public 
goods; incentives (by taxes and subsidies), and ; regulation. There are several models of 
the optimal provision of public goods, and the problems associated with revelation of true 
preferences. Most of the results suggest that, although the government may not be able to 
provide the theoretically efficient level of public goods, it can improve efficiency toward 
the optimal level. However, how much of a public good is optimal has not been 
determined, nor has which type of public good will have a more positive impact on 
growth. This implies the need for empirical evidence. It is vital for policy makers to 
know what type of public goods and services would lead to a greater enhancement to 
growth, is it public capital, some types of it, or other services, and how much of it ? 
We have discussed, above, how taxes can affect business location decisions and 
thus state or local growth. As far as economic efficiency is concerned, a tax or a tax 
increase generally causes a loss of economic efficiency. This is because it generally 
causes agents to change their behavior. These changes of behavior cause a departure away 
from optimality to a less efficient situation. 
To sum up, the above discussion indicates that government intervention to 
provide public goods can correct for market failure, improve efficiency and increase 
society's welfare. It is concluded that the determination of the optimal level or mix of 
public goods necessitates empirical evidence. The provision of public goods is in general, 
and for the most part, financed by taxes. Taxes affect firm location and thus state and 
local economic growth. To what extent are tax effects significant in this regard ? That 
also necessitates empirical evidence. Also, as far as economic efficiency is concerned, the 
effects of taxes by themselves are that they cause loss of efficiency. If the provision of 
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public capital might have positive effects on growth while such provision implies taxes or 
tax increases , and taxes have negative effects on growth, what is the net effect in this 
regard ? Again, empirical evidence is needed to shed light on these questions. 
Empirical review: 
It has been concluded in the previous section that empirical evidence is needed to 
check for the significance of the effects of public infrastructure capital stock and taxes on 
state and local economic development Now, we focus on what the empirical evidence 
suggests in this regard. First, we shall look at enipirical evidence on the effects - on 
regional economic growth - of public infrastructure capital, then we turn to the effects of 
taxes. The section · on the empirical review of the· effects of taxes shall, of course, also 
cover those studies :that include both tax variables as wen as public capital stock and 
public services variables. 
Public capital: 
Before we proceed, it worthwhile to note some basic features of the studies of the 
' . . . ~ . __ :. ~ i: \ . :... : - i . . ; .:~ .. - '~ _:( . 
impact of public infrastructure on state and local economic development. These pertain 
to the public capital measure used by the studies; the economic growth measure 
considered; the methodological problems ; and the findings of such studies. These shall 
be outlined in what follows. 
Some of the studies considered the effect of public capital on economic growth 
using national data, i.e. their estimation: were for the national economy. Some considered 
census regions, or Sunbelt vs. Snowbelt. Some considered state level. Others considered 
smaller regions such as metropolitical statistical areas, cities or countries. While some of 
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these studies used total public capital, not just public infrastructure capital, some of them 
considered types of public capital. 
All earlier studies (before 1990), that have investigated the effects of public 
infrastructure capital stocks on regional economic growth, with few exceptions (basically 
Eberts 1986, 1989, Dalenberg 1987, Eberts and Fogarty 1987, Eberts and Deno1989) 
have used public 'expenditure or the number of government employees as proxies for 
public infrastructure capital stock and thus · were not able to directly estimate the 
relationship between public infrastructure capital stocks, and regional economic growth. 
The recent studies, from 1990· and on, are dominated by the use of public capital stock 
estimates, and thereby , are considered as attempts to estimate the direct relationship 
between public capital stock and economic growth. 
-Different measures of economic growth are used by all of the mentioned studies. 
These measures include: productivity, output growth, employment and firm location 
indicators. - -Most of the studies that used productivity and output growth indicators of 
economic growth have,estimated a version 'Of:an aggregate production function., Some of 
the models that used productivity measures as indicators of economic growth have used 
private sector productivity, while others used manufacturing productivity. Bartik (1996) 
and others argue that manufacturing productivity could-be a better indicator·of·economic 
growth·than private sector productivity because manufacturing'data is more accurate and 
better measured than private sector productivity. Further, they argue that empirical 
evidence on the relationship between public capital, or broadly public services, could 
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yield better results if it focuses on manufacturing output growth instead of productivity 
growth for several reasons, outlined by Bartik as follows: 
"Output growth is easier to measure than productivity growth. A 
positive effect of pubic services on state manufacturing output 
growth is a good sign of a positive effect of public services on 
productivity; manufacturers serve a · national market, so a states 
cost structure is the key variable affecting its attractiveness to 
manufacturers. In addition, the effects of public services in 
attracting labor to a state will be captured by an output measure, 
but not by a productivity measure'. Finally, from the perspective of 
state and local policy makers, the effects of fiscal policies on 
business output are at leas.t as important as their effects on business 
productivity".(Bartik 1996, p.50 .) 
Another indicator of economic growth used by the studies of the impact of public 
capital and services on growth, is the number of firms, whether firms enter the 
jurisdiction under study, i.e. move from other jurisdictions, or new business startups in 
the jurisdiction. This is because more firms in the area, or more branches of firms, would 
in general imply more output, more jobs and more revenue for government. The effects 
of the number of new firms in the area might extend beyond the direct increase in output 
or employment brought about by such new businesses. It might also include the benefits 
of agglomeration, and the increase in household income and thus aggregate demand. 
Therefore, a considerable portion of the studies of the impact of· public capital and 
spending on regional economic growth have used firm location models. The framework 
of firm location models has the advantage of combining public fiscal spending variables 
with public capital infrastructure variables, as shall be elaborated later in this study. 
There are several methodological problems associated with previous research, 
specially earlier research. Such problems are outlined in chapter I in the section of the 
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statement of the research problems. 
discussion. 
However, two of them deserve a bit more 
Holtz-Eakin (1992) has argued that there are state or region-specific unobserved, 
unmeasured or inaccurately measured characteristics which cause private sector 
productivity to differ between states or regions. Examples of such characteristics are the 
quality of inputs, climate, location, political and social features. Failure to control for 
these characteristics might bias the estimated impact of public capital on economic 
growth. The other point is that, as argued by Bartik (1996) and others, productivity 
measures might not be a good indicator of the efficiency of a local economy. This is 
because, among other reasons, of the difficulty and inaccuracy of the productivity 
measure. 
There are general trends that can be seen from the literature of empirical research 
on the impact of public capital on regional economic development. The more recent 
empirical studies found more evidence for the significance of the impact of state and local 
infrastructure capital on regional economic growth than earlier research did. This trend in 
empirical findings might be attributed mainly to three factors. First, instead of using 
capital outlays or the public sector employment as proxies for public capital stocks, more 
recent studies used estimates of public infrastructure capital stocks, and thus were able to 
directly estimate the relationship between public infrastructure capital and regional 
economic development. Second, although some of the earlier empirical studies have 
considered different types of public capital, most of the recent studies that used public 
capital stock estimates have used total public capital stock estimates. Only the latest 
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studies considered different types of public capital stocks. Lastly, recent studies have 
shown that when controlling for region or state-specific fixed effects, public capital 
becomes insignificant or less significant. 
It should be noted that there are a considerable number of studies on the 
effectiveness of state and local public services. Those studies, it is to be stressed, are 
about state. and local public services, not public physical infrastructure capital. They are 
about services such as fire protection and schools. So, they are a broader consideration 
than physical public infrastructure capital. This is also an extremely important question. 
However, sometimes the results of . such studies are .combined with, and estimated 
together with, those of public physical infrastructure capital stocks. Still, there might not 
be a problem with that unless the stock and spending flow of the same variable is ·set in 
the same estimation model. But the specific point to be noted-·is that the reader should 
· not be confused when looking at some studies, especially empirical review studies, 
because it might seem that the percentage of recent studies that found a significant 
relationship.:between public capital stoc.k .. iand,economic growth is substantial. For 
example, Bartik {1996) reviewed the new studies that investigated the relationship 
between public services and economic development. Those are mixed in the review with 
public capital stock and ,economic development. · Although not readily clear from the 
review, a distinction should be made between public services and physical capital stocks. 
The percentage of the new studies that found a significant relationship between public 
infrastructure capital stock and regional economic growth is not as large as that given for 
public services. Another related point that deserves mention is that Bartik (1996 p .18) 
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calculated the long-run effects of different types of state and real public spending on a 
state's manufacturing productivity and manufacturing output, using the results of new 
empirical studies. He concluded that public services effects are large enough to be 
considered in policy decisions. However, caution should be taken when considering those 
calculations, because Bartik has assumed that the sources of finance for such spending 
increases is welfare reductions. This assumption made by Bartik and others is criticized, 
notably by Lynch (1996), because public services are in reality not financed by welfare 
reductions. This is an important point. The above mentioned calculations are for the 
effects of public services and would not be the net effect of any policy package because 
the effects of the tax increase necessary to finance these are still to be subtracted from 
those calculation results. Therefore, the resultant effects would not be as large as those 
reported. 
Now we tum to review the notable empirical studies on the impact of public stock 
on regional economic growth. 
Mera (1975) introduced social overhead capital or simply social capital into the 
production function as a way to estimate the impact of public capital on economic 
growth. Thus, there would be three inputs instead of the normal two; the private inputs 
labor and capital, and social capital. The private inputs are allocated through markets, 
while social capital is provided by government. He assumed that the production function 
of each sector in each region has its own technology. He used U.S data (from 1947 to 
1963) to estimate an equilibrium model constructed with the use of production functions 
of the Cobb-Douglas type, assuming perfect mobility of labor and capital between 
34 
regions. Data is constructed by use of data readily available for census regions, as well as 
dis-aggregation of the national data for social overhead capital to regions based on a . 
concept of regional shares. He found that the economic growth rate in a region is · 
·_ determined primarily by the growth of social capital and technical progress in the region. 
The growth of the private ,inputs, i.e. labor and private capital, responds to growth 
differentials in social capital· and technical progress. ·Growth· in l~ss-developed regions is 
. . . . 
primarily due to the growth of technology~ whereas in more developed regions growth is 
dueto growth of social capital. 
, · DeRooy (1978) has estimated,a cross-sectional econometric model of economic 
-development to determine the impact of potential-contributions:to economic development 
of public .investment in social overhead capital (SOC), or infrastructure, in the 16 <'Sun 
belt" states. and the 14 "Snow-belt'' states. The model contained single equations for 
income, unemployment and·poverty. It used 1970 data for the states included in the. 
study. He found no significant differences in the sizes of impact multipliers of SOC and 
· suppprt ,serv..ioes betwe.en · Sunbelt md· Snow•.belt · regions·. Highly significant multipliers 
were found for· education, major -commercial airports and total investment in SOC.· -No 
significant relation was found between economic development and investment in health 
care facilities and roads. · '· 
Looney.and Frederikson (1981) used multiple regression :analysis to estimate 
production functions for. Mexico .to examine Hansen's hypothesis, explained earlier in 
this study, that economic overhead capital has greater impact on GDP in intermediate 
regions but not in lagging regions and social overhead capital has greater impact in 
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. lagging regions but not in intermediate regions. Their results supported Hansen's theory. 
They conducted a test of causality which indicates that public capital investment precedes 
income growth. Their results provide evidence that infrastructure is an initiating factor in 
the economic development process, rather than a passive or accommodating factor. That 
is evidence in supporting Hansen's hypothesis. 
Plaut and Pluta (1983) regressed three measures of industrial growth - growth of 
' ' 
real value added, employment, and real private capital stock - on variables measuring the 
relative probability of states for industrial expansion, 'including business climate variables 
• ' • 1, 
and other variables. ·-The theoretical construct underlying their empirical model ·Was the 
disequilibrium adjustment model. The results for the three indicators of growth they used 
are similar; · In the regression that has the aggregate percentage. change in manufacturing 
as the dependent variable they found a significant positive coefficient for public spending 
on education. Some more details and discussions of Plaut and Pluta' s model will be 
given in Chapter m. 
· · Hulten and-Schwab (1984) investigate:the causes .of differential regional growth 
and the sources -of the· slowdown· in manufacturing ·productivity. They examine ·whether or 
not the economic performance of the Snow Belt region is · due to an aging public 
infrastructue and deteriorating urban environment. Basically, they t~stwhether total factor 
productivity (TFP) significantly differs between Snow-Belt regions and Sunbelt regions. 
They used a framework derived from the neoclassical growth theory of production. They 
assumed a Hicks-neutral production function relating real production to real factor input, 
where input prices are equal to the value of their marginal products. They disaggregated 
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the growth rate of real value-added in total manufacturing to the nine census regions and 
then allocated it to the growth .rates of regional capital stocks, labor and total factor . 
productivity(TFP). They used data for the 1951-78 period. They found that regional 
variation in output growth was not due to differences in productivity growth, but to 
variations in the rates of growth .of capital ... and labor. They conclude that there is no 
evidence to support the belief that the aging public infrastructure has slowed TFP in the 
snow Belt. This conclusion is simply based on their findings that there is no significant 
difference in TFP.between the:Snow belt arid.the Sun Belt .. What is important, as far as 
our study is concerned,.· is· that their findings and conclusion show that differences in, 
public infrastructure have no . significant explanatory. power for differences in output· 
growth between regions. However, Eb~rts (1990b) has explained that Hulten and Schwab 
have .not directly· estimated the effects of public infrastructure on regional productivity. 
He tests Hulten .and Schwab's assertion by directly estimating the impact of public 
infrastructure growth on manufacturing TFP growth, .and found that public infrastructure 
has. a,positive and: statistically :significant· effect on: TEP~ ·We shall. review. Eberts. ,w:orlc 
later below. 
Helms (1985) investigated the effects of several factors, including public spending 
and taxes,onthe gr.owth .of:states'. real personaLincome during the period 1965,.1979. He 
found that public spending on highways, focal schools and higher · education has a 
significant impact on the growth of state personal income. Because Helms work is of 
very specific interest to our current study, we shall return to it below. when we review 
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empirical studies that attempted to find the net effect of public capital increases or public 
spending and the tax increases used to financethem. 
Wasylenko and McGuire (1985) examined employment growth in the 48 
contiguous states through the period 1973-1980. The dependent variables they used were 
the percentage change in employment in each of six major industries. The independent 
variables included, with other variables, fiscal variables. Different versions of state and 
local education spending scaled by state personal income were included as independent 
variables. Education expenditures were found to have significant positive .coefficient for 
growth in total state employment and two major industries: retail trade and finance, but 
not significant for the other four major . industries; manufacturing, transportation, 
wholesale and services. 
Eberts ( 1986) is the first study, after Mera (1975) to start the line of studies that 
use public capital . stock estimates, instead of proxies for public capital such as capital 
outlays or government employment, to estimate the impact of public infrastructure capital 
on regional; econqmic .growth.· . Although, ,and. surprisingly, most oLthe .. studies in: this 
regard in ,the ·.1990~ s have referred to Aschauer' s (1990) results, the work of Eberts (1986) 
has paved the way for endeavors to construct and use public capital stock estimates in 
studies of the,impact of public capital on economic growth in different jurisdictional 
levels. Eberts; Dalenberg and,Park (1986) in a project funded by the National Science 
Foundation (NSF), constructed a public capital stock series for 38 standard statistical 
metropolitan areas for the period 1958-81. They used the perpetual inventory technique 
to evaluate this public and private capital stock series. 
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The perpetual inventory method is an approach used by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) for constructing public and private capital stock data for the national 
level. Basically under such method, the estimate of capital stock is the sum of the capital 
purchases when capital was put in place, the purchase value of replacements adjusted for 
inflation, depreciation, less the perpetual value of discard. So, Eberts (1986) was the first 
attempt to use the above mentioned data series, of the 38 SMSA's, to estimate the impact 
of public capital stock on regional manufacturing production. Public capital stock was 
entered into a translog production function as an input. He found that public capital stock 
has a positive and statistically significant impact on manufacturing output. This is 
consistent with the view that public capital is an unpaid factor of production. He also 
found that its impact is much less than that of private capital and labor. Its output 
elasticity is only 0.03. The third main finding was that public capital and labor were 
complementary, while public capital and private capital are substitutes. Private capital 
and labor are also substitutes. He concluded that public capital is important to economic 
growth and explained that public infrastructure capital is an essential element of 
agglomeration economics. 
Place(1986) found that per capita public spending on highways has no significant 
impact on firm location. He further found that per capita public spending on sewer and 
education has a negative but insignificant impact on firm location, whereas welfare 
spending has a negative and significant impact on firm location. Similar results were 
found by Quan & Beck (1987) who found that public spending on local and higher 
education have no significant effect on business location. 
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Costa, Ellson and Martin (1987) tested the relationship between public capital and 
other productive factors using a translog production function. Their goal was to estimate 
the association between public capital and regional output. They estimated a production 
function using cross-sectional data for 1972. Their public capital variable was total state 
public capital for 1972, which they estimated using the perpetual inventory method of 
BEA. They found that labor and public capital are complementary inputs, and that public 
capital has diminishing returns. The relationship between public and private capital was 
less clear-cut. They also computed the elasticity of public capital and the scale elasticity 
for each state. Their findings support Hansen's hypothesis that the ratio of public to 
private capital has a negative relationship with the output elasticity of public capital. 
They concluded from this point that the impact of public infrastructure investments on the 
development of poor regions is still questionable. 
Eberts and Fogarty (1987) investigated the casual relationship between public and 
private investment. They used public capital outlay and manufacturing investment data 
for the period 1904 to 1978 for 40 cities. They performed the Sims test of "Granger 
Causality" on such data. Granger's causality is based on the predictive ability of one 
series to explain another. They found a significant causal relationship between public 
outlays and private investment in 33 of 40 SMSA's. Their results indicate that 
"The direction of causation goes both ways. Private 
investment is more likely to influence public outlays in 
cities located in the south and in cities that have 
experienced tremendous growth after 1950. Public outlays 
are more likely to influence private investment in cities that 
experienced much of their growth before 1950." (Eberts, 
1990 p25). 
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Schmenner, Huber and Cooke (1987) have studied the effects of different factors, 
including fiscal variables among·other variables, on the location decisions of Fortune 500 
plants opened during the 1970's. They found that state and local spending per dollar of 
personal income had no significant impact on Fortune 500 plant location decisions· during 
that period. 
Similar results oLno significant effect of state and local spending on economic 
growth are found· by Papke (1987). She investigated the determinants of new private 
investment for the 2-digit and 3-digit industries in twenty states in 1978. She found that 
public expenditure on police and fire protection had no significant impact on new private 
investment. 
One of the studies that found a negative relationship between public spending on 
public·. infrastructure· ·capital and public services and economic growth is W azylenko 
(1988). He has examined the impact of several factors, including among other variables 
,public spending ·On public infrastructure and publicservices;.on,state.employment in the 
period 1980,..85. · His study considered total nonagricultural employment, as well as 
employment in seven major industries. He found that the coefficient of state and local 
expenditure as a percentage of state personal income is significant and has a positive sign 
for only two industries; transportation, and non-durable manufacturing. However, he 
found that state and local expenditure as a percentage of state personal income is not 
significant for the four major industries nor for total nonagricultural employment, and that 
it actually had a negative and significant effect on durable manufacturing. 
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McGuire & Wasylenko (1989) found no significant impact of public spending on 
higher education, education, and welfare, on business location, whereas public spending 
on highways has a significant negative impact. Bartik (1989) found that public spending 
on fire protection has a positive and significant impact on small businesses startups, but 
public spending on education and highways has no significant impact on business 
location, whereas public spending on higher education and police has a negative but 
insignificant effect, and welfare has a negative and significant effect. 
Eberts (1990 b) tested Holten and Schwab's (1984) assertion discussed earlier in 
this section. Holten and Schwab found no significant difference in 1FP (total factor 
productivity) between the Snow Belt and Sun Belt regions, and concluded that there is no 
evidence to support the belief. that aging public infrastructure has slowed 1FP in the 
Snow Belt. Since Holten and Schwab did not directly estimate the relationship between 
public infrastructure and regional manufacturing productivity, Eberts work is to estimate 
such a relationship directly -by -using· public infrastructure capital stock estimate for 36 
SMSA's for the period 1965-1977. Capital stock estimates were constructed using the 
perpetual inventory approach. Public . capital stock growth rates and other determinants 
were used to estimate growth rates of TFP. Manufacturing output is measured by 
manufacturing value .added, deflated .by the producers price index. Simple correlation 
procedures between the growth rate of public capital stock and the growth rate of TFP, 
controlling for the age of SMSA's, shows that public capital stock has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on TFP; a 1 % increase in public capital stock is associated 
with a 0.49 % increase in TFP. So, contrary to Holten and Schwab's result, Eberts result 
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indicate that public infrastructure capital stock variations across. SMSA's have positive 
and statistically significant effects on TFP across regions. However, his finding is 
consistent with Hulten and Schwab's that the variation across SMSA's of the slowdown 
in output growth is not significantly correlated with the change in growth rate of public 
capital stock. 
Alicia Munnell (1990a) examined the relationship between public capital 
investment and private· economic activity. The regional economic growth measures she 
used are gross state output, employment growth and private investment. She first 
constructed estimates of public and private capital stocks for the state-by-state level, 
using the perpetual inventory approach used by the BEA for generating public and private 
capital stock data for the national level. Then she used pooled state output, capital and 
labor data for the period 1970 to 1986 to estimate an. aggregate production function 
treating public capital as an input in the production function, entered as an unpaid factor, 
to test for the statistical significance of the impact of public· capital· stock on real gross 
,state output. She found that public capital stock has a statistically significant positive 
impact on the level of output: and does belong to the · production function. Then she 
examined the relationship between public capital investment and private investment. 
However, her results in this regard are not as clear-cut, since the net effect of pubhc 
capital is that it positively affects the marginal productivity of private capital and it also 
substitutes for private capital. · Finally, she examined the impact of public capital stock on 
state employment growth. She used state public capital stocks within the context of a 
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firm location model of dis-equilibrium adjust. She found that public infrastructure capital 
has a positive and statistically significant impact on employment growth. 
Hulten and Schwab (1991) examined the relationship between infrastructure and 
economic performance. . They estimated the determinants of MFP (multifactor 
productivity) growth with a production function that includes private inputs and public 
capital stock. They used data of output, private inputs and public capital by census 
regions for the period 1970-86. Their public capital variables include total public capital, 
as well as roads, water/sewer and 'other', where other includes the rest of public capital 
investment. A distinguished contribution of their study is that they considered both of the 
channels through which public capital is hypothesized (by Meade, 1952) to enter the 
production function, i.e. as .an unpaid factor, as well as an atmosphere factor that 
augments the productivity of private inputs. Their formulations oLthe production 
function included . both specifications. They found that the coefficients of the public 
capital variables, whether total or types, were always insignificant. They conclude that 
the. linkbetweenpublic infrastructure and economic performance. is weak.,.,.;. 
Eisner (1991). examined the relationship between infrastructure and regional 
economic performance. He estimated a production function with annual real GSP (state 
private gross output} as a:dependent variable, entering total public capital and types of 
public capital in·the: production. function, for the period , 1970-1986. He controlled . for 
state-specific fixed effect characteristics. He found that total public capital does not have 
a significant impact on regional economic performance; highways and water/sewer 
variables have positive and statistically significant coefficients; while the variable 'other', 
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which measures the rest of the public capital stock after subtracting highways and 
water/sewer infrastructure capital stocks, has a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient. 
Holtz-Eakin (1992) examined the relationship between public sector capital and 
private productivity. He estimated production functions using data on annual real private 
gross state product as well as regional private gross product as dependent variables. Total 
public capital was entered into the production function. He controlled for unobserved 
region and state-specific characteristics. He found that the coefficient of public capital is 
not statistically significant. Holtz-Eakin argues that one of the major problems that leads 
to the lack of consensus among earlier researchers of the impact of state and local public 
capital stock on regional economic growth is the failure to control for unobserved or 
unmeasured state or regional characteristics. He argues that the results of previous 
research were exaggerated and misleading because when controlling for region or state-
specific fixed effects the positive effects found by previous research for public capital on 
private productivity would disappear or become insignificant. (As discussed earlier in 
this study, Bartik, 1996, has explained other possible sources for the mentioned lack of 
consensus.) 
Moomaw, Mullen and Williams (1995) examined the inter-regional impact of 
public infrastructure capital on economic performance. They estimated an aggregate 
translog production function entering public capital as an input, using state-by-state data 
for the years 1970, 1980 and 1986, to get state-by-state estimates of the output elasticity 
of aggregate public capital stock as a total as well as for the types of public capital used. 
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Using the resultant elasticity estimates, they conducted regional comparative analysis of 
the output elasticities. In addition to that they tested Hansen's hypothesis. They found 
that aggregate public capital as well as water/sewer capital stock variables have positive 
and statistically significant impacts on regional output. They concluded that: 
Taxes: 
"Generally aggregate public capital and two of its components 
(highways, water and sewer systems) make a positive contribution 
to state output. Water and Sewer systems have a much larger 
effect on state output than highways and "other" public capital 
stocks, respectively. The regional influence on the impact of water 
and sewer systems is Illore pronounced for states in the south. The 
implication is that additional investment in waste disposal and 
water systems offers a greater stimulant to regional economy than 
increased public funding for highways. Also, a willingness, to 
facilitate the building of water and sewer infrastructure may allow 
states. to. maintain or enhance their competitive advantage in 
attracting new facilities and jobs:" (Moomaw et. Al., 1995, p.843.) 
"The impact of state and local taxes upon the ability of a state to attract new 
business investment has been and continues to be a subject of controversy. Economic 
theory suggests that inter-jurisdictional tax differentials should make a difference in the 
location of economic activity. Yet empirical evidence is inconclusive.'' (Olson, 1990, 
p.34) '-''· .. ·- _ -··. 
Now we tum to empirical evidence on the effects- of taxes on state and local 
economic development, which has been and continues to be a subject of controversy. This 
section will also cover the review of those empirical studies that have estimated the · 
effects of taxes as well asthose of public infrastructure capital, or more generally, public 
services, together in the same modeL A more detailed review of this approach of 
estimating the effects of both · taxes and public capital stock or public services is also 
presented in chapter ID. 
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The concern of researchers and · policy makers on the effects of state and local 
taxes on economic development has been due to such taxes being a major part of state 
and local economic development policies. State and local economic development policies 
include those policies that offer incentives to attract businesses. Such incentives include 
grants, such as land grants, or the right-to-use certain local natural resources at below-
market prices; low-interest loans for new firm · openings, tax incentives such as. property 
tax abatements and.other types of tax exemptions; and what Bartik (1991) has termed 
"new wave'' economic development policies which encourage innovation. and business 
expansion into export markets. Tax incentives constitute the major component of 
. economic development policies. 
The concern of researchers and policy-makers about the effects of state and local 
taxes is thus due to two considerations: the effect of tax levels on the ability of a state or 
local economy to attractbusinesses; and the fact that tax incentives are very expensive, in 
terms of tax revenue lost. Yet, competition among states and localities for additional 
economic development has. qontinued. The .. recent attention to the deterioration of public 
infrastructure has · increased the interest of researchers and concern of policy makers to 
find out the extent of the effects of state and local taxes on economic development. The 
quality of public infrastructure is.seen as having a potential influence on state and local 
economic development through its effects on private output and at the same time on the 
attractiveness of the state or local area for businesses. Lower taxes or higher tax 
incentives.are seen as having potential impacts on firm location decisions. 
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Most of the studies on the relationship between state and local taxes and economic 
development use either firm location models or some measure of economic growth within 
the context of a firm location model. This is because the theoretical framework of a 
location model uses as explanatory variables, a scope of factors that have potential direct 
or indirect effects on the revenues and the costs to firms. Taxes are viewed as costs by the 
profit-maximizing firm. 
Most econometric models of firm location, or growth within the context of a firm 
location model, are cross-sectional analysis. It is typical to find the percentage change in 
the number of firms, or percentage change in the growth measure - whether output, 
employment or private capital - , regressed on factors that are expected to have potential 
impacts on business profitability. 
The general consensus of previous empirical studies on the effects of state and 
local taxes on economic development is that there are no statistically significant effects of 
state and local taxes on state or local economic development. The most recent empirical 
research tends to find a significant relationship between state and local taxes on state or 
local economic development. 
There are three main reasons that are usually stated for explaining why changes in 
state and local taxes have little or no significant impact on state and local economic 
development. First, there are so many other factors that affect business location decisions 
and state and local taxes do not constitute a major one. Second, interstate or inter-
jurisdictional tax differentials do not constitute a considerable difference in business cost, 
and such differentials might be outweighed by differences in amenities or market-climate. 
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Third, the number of footloose firms that might be attracted by tax incentives is not large 
enough. 
However, a considerable number of recent empirical studies of the effect of state 
and local taxes on economic development have found statistically negative effects of such 
taxes on state and local economic development. Bartik (1991) has summarized 57 studies 
since 1979 that have examined the impacts of state and local taxes on some measure of 
state and local business activity, such as employment, output, or private capital stock. 
Seventy percent of them (i.e. 40 out of 57 studies) have found at least one statistically 
significant negative tax effect. He concluded that evidence indicates that state and local 
taxes have much stronger effects on state and local economic development than was 
believed previously. 
Survey evidence also presents mixed views on the impact of tax differentials on 
business locations. Early questionnaire surveys indicate no considerable impact of taxes 
on firm locations, whereas very recent surveys indicate that there is some impact of taxes 
on business locations. However, survey evidence is not very reliable. Firms may 
,)' · .. •,•: ', 
exaggerate the role of tax differentials on business location, especially their responses 
with regard to tax incentives. The significance of tax coefficients in firm location models 
is, by itself, not necessarily sufficient to conclude from empirical evidence that tax 
decreases or incentives can benefit a state or local economy 
It is difficult to draw any conclusions based on the evidence reviewed. However, 
an even more interesting question can be raised within the context of the effects of tax 
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incentives. Suppose tax incentives are effective in attracting businesses and/or expanding 
existing businesses and thus creating jobs, and suppose further that those jobs do benefit 
people in the state or locality under consideration, then the question is: are such policies 
cost-effective? 
Lynch (1996) used data on the cost per job of several state and local tax incentive 
packages and Bartik's estimate of the long-run elasticity of business activity with respect 
to state and local taxes ( -0.1 to -0.6 ) and roughly calculated that the cost per job created 
by tax reductions for 199lvaries between $9,000 and $53,000 per year. His review of 
empirical studies concluded that ''while _ benefits of tax cuts and incentives are 
·insignificant or questionable at best, their costs are clear and probably more substantial." 
(Lynch, 1991, p.952). He gave several reasons whr the findings ,of recent econometric 
research that Jax cuts are effective in creating jobs and enhancing state and local 
economic growth are not valid. _ The most important of these reasons was that the positive 
effects of tax cuts reported by Bartik (1991 - 94) were based on the assumption that taxes 
can be cut witlwut n~ducing pµbljc ser.vic~~- . lie, argued that t_lle assuinption that tax cuts 
can be financed by welfare programs reductions is_ not sound and tax cuts are mainly 
financed by non-welfare cuts, i.e. cuts in public services. 
It is important to_ note that Lynch did not argue that business tax incentives are not 
effective in creating jobs, but instead he questioned whether they do that in a cost-
effective manner. The most important question raised by Lynch was: which effects on 
growth are stronger, the positive effects of tax cuts (incentives) or the negative effects of 
public services reductions made to finance such tax cuts? 
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Four econometric studies (Helms 1985, Bartik 1989, Munnell 1990, and Bartik 
. 1996) found that increases in state and local taxes for financing increases in public 
services have positive effects on state . and local economic growth. Lynch noted that 
although there are only four studies, they should give pause to the proponents of tax cuts 
financed by c;lecreases in pµblic services. 
A review of the notable individual empirical studies may help to summarize the 
major results with respect to tax incentives and econpmic development. 
- ~ . ' • ·. ; l • : '. . • . . • 
Carlton (1979) examined the factors that influence the location decisions of firms. 
"t ~ . . ! ' 
. · He tested the statistical significance 'of·. tax variables within · other variables, on firm 
location. The units of observ~tion were large SMSA's in the U.S. His model explained 
. ,:··· .' ·,' .. . 
new births o(manufac~g firms, including new single establishment firms and new . 
branch plants. The industries . studied were plastic products, electronic transmitting 
equipment~ and electr?nic components. He used Dun and Bradstreet data on new single 
estal>lished bi~ for two periods, eac.h approximately for four years: 1967-71 and 1972-
--: - .,,. ;,_~:. i.•.;ti_;1.•.-..i :1.• . .1.i U,._L_', ;:"}-· .. __ ? __ '.~ :.'.i ... .:..i_Ci_~-.<· !;".\ .. :>".:: ~-.__:,.J ... -._. .. .. ··,~•JI::·· ... ·· - •-_;: __ :_: 
75. Da~ _on :p.ew branch plants was for one period: 1967-71. Variables used include 
' . I, . \".: .... - . ,. 
wages, corporate tax rates, property taxes measured by effective property taxes, state 
personal income_ tax, .. <1; measure of el~ctricity cost, natural gas cost, a measure of 
_ ' • · , ; :.L ·. ; ~ ] 
agglomeration (production m3!);-hours in ~ee ,c()des of 4-digit SIC code industry in an 
SMSA), number of engineers by.SMSA, incentives offered by an SMSA, unemployment 
rate, and other variables. 
51 
Results for the tax variables are either of the wrong sign or statistically 
insignificant. He concluded that it is not evident that taxes provide strong deterrents to 
business location; The coefficients for wages and agglomeration variables were 
significant and indicate that such variables are likely to have considerable impacts on new 
funi location. 
Carlton then tried to explain why tax variab~es perform poorly. . 
"It is difficult to understand why taxes do not matter more strongly 
in influencing new .births~ especially in view _of the frequent public 
clamoring _ of business against taxes. One possible explanation is 
that . because of immobility of certain factors of production, taxes 
are totally born by factors of production in terms of lower 
remuneration" (Carlton, 1~79, p.37) 
The other reasons he gave are, in general, not different from the ones discussed earlier in 
this section. 
Plaut and Pluta's (1983) empirical study of the relationship between business 
Climate, taxes and p:ublic · spending and_ state and local industrial growth was summarized 
earlier in our review of the empirical evidence on the effects of public capital on region~ 
economic development. Therefore, all that remains is to mention their results ,on the tax_ 
• • ' ' • ' ' • • • ' • • • • • • < • • • • • • A•~ • ' • 
variables they included ~ their . estimation._ The business climate, tax and_ expenditure 
variables~ they used as a_ group were found to be insignificantly related to overall state 
industrial growth, but significantly related to the other two measures of growth they used, 
i.e. state employment and private capital stock growth. Individually, poor business 
. . . 
climate and high tax effort seem to have a negative effect particularly on employment 
-growth. The sign of the property tax coefficient is statistically significant but is positive. 
The explanation offered by Plaut and Pluta is that high property taxes indicate that the tax 
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system is a locally dominated tax system (i.e. not state-dominated) and firms might be 
attracted to those states that have locally-dominated tax systems to avoid high state taxes, 
in addition to the possibility that local taxes might be matched by local public services. 
Wazylenko and McGuire's (1985) empirical study of the effects of business 
climate on state employment growth rates is reviewed earlier in this study. However, their 
results on their estimates of the effects of tax variables deserve mention here. The 
coefficient on the personal income tax rate was significant and negative for retail trade, 
. wholesale trade and finance industries. However, it is not significant for total state 
employment as well as the three other major industries: manufacturing, transportation and 
services. The sales tax is significant only for wholesale trade, and neither significant for 
total employment, nor for the remaining five major industries. The effective corporate 
income tax variable was not significant for any of the industries, nor for total 
employment. 
Helms' (1985) study is also outlined above. His results for his tax variables are 
that both of the tax measures (property tax and 'other' taxes) have no statistically 
significant impact on the growth of states' personal income for the period 1965-79. An 
interesting and very outstanding finding by Helms in that study is that the net effect of an 
increase in property taxes used to finance an increase in education spending was positive 
for the growth of state income, for the period of the study. This point is very crucial, since 
a positive and statistically significant effect of an increase in public capital stock or public 
services would not by itself be sufficient information to policy makers. Similarly, a 
negative and significant coefficient of a tax variable would not by itself be a sufficient 
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reason for policy makers to adopt tax cuts or tax incentives to attract businesses. Helms 
model is a useful framework to estimate the net effect of a policy package, especially if 
we bear in mind that increases in state and local public infrastructure capital stocks or 
public services are usually for the most part financed by increases in state and local taxes. 
Bartik (1985) examined the potential determinants of location decisions for 
Fortune 500 firms for the period 1972 to 1978. He found a negative and statistically 
significant impact of the effective corporate tax rate. However, he found the property tax 
rate, unemployed. insurance tax rate and workers compensation tax coefficients 
statistically insignificant or of the wrong sign.· 
Other studies reviewed above, with regard to the effects of public infrastructure or 
public spending on economic growth, also estimated the effects of tax variables. 
Schmenner, Huber and Cooke's (1987) study indicated that corporate tax rates, as well as 
property tax variables had no statistically significant impact on the location decisions of 
new Fortune 500 plants opened in 1970s. Papke's (1987) s~udy found no statistically 
significant impact.fpqlw_AC:JR business tax, and effective state tax rates on new private 
investment. Wasylenko (1988) found a negative and statistically significant effect of state 
and local tax revenues, as a percent of state income, on employment growth in two major 
industries: manufacturing and non-durable manufacturing industries, but in none of the 
other five major industries. His results also had the wrong (unexpected) signs for the 
coefficients of two other tax variables in four major industries. 
Alicia Munnell (1990a), with a primary interest in examining the impact of public 
capital stock on state employment growth, examined the effect of taxes on state 
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employment growth in the period 1980 to 1988. She constructed an employment growth 
model within the context of a firm location model, based on the disequilibrium 
adjustment model. The tax variable included in the model was state tax revenue scaled by 
state personal income. The -results show that this tax -variable has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient. · 
Munnell' s study is one of the few studies that considered estimating the net effect 
of public infrastructure capital stock increases and tax increases made to finance them, 
following the approach set by Helms (1985) outlined above. Munnell found that increases 
.· . . .. 
in total state and local taxes used to finance improveni.ents in public infrastructure were 
likely to have a positive impact on the state private employment growth rate. 
Bartik~s {1996) study is one of the other few studies that followed Helms' 
approach in estimating the net effect of increases in taxes used to finance increases or 
improvements in public -infrastructure. He found that increases in property taxes used to 
finance increases in higher education--and-- health care, would increase the long-run 
· \;fit""< ~i /' r: i. _ l.. · · '. ·: '. , ; ,"" 
·l··-:1' 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter we describe the theoretical framework on the basis of which we 
examine the effects of state and local public infrastructure capital stocks and taxes on 
regional economic growth. The first section presents the underlying theoretical model. 
The second section explains how the independent variables are related to employment 
growth. 
Underlying Theoretical Model: 
In their study that examines the effects of changes in the potential for federal 
offset and price/migration tax exporting on state tax structures, Gade and Adkins (1990) 
modeled the choice of taxes at the state level as if a state government official maximizes 
her effective voter support. Although the problem studied is different, in what follows we 
are going to use some of the steps of their modeling. Suppose that a state government 
growth, which can be measured by state employment growth (E), public infrastructure 
(agent maximizes a welfare function (:,N). His welfare is a function of state economic G), 
and non-business taxes (T2): 
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W = W ( E, G, T 2) ---------------------------------------------- (1) 
Wis positively related to E, but negatively related to T2, because T2 is positively related 
with household out-migration. McFadden (1974) regards human choice of geographical 
locations as the result of individual maximization of a specific utility function. Higher 
non-business taxes motivate households to move out of state, causing a fall in tax revenue 
collected in the state. Higher T 2 borne by households also erodes voter support for the 
state government agent. For these reasons, W is also positively related to G. 
The state employment growth (E) is a function of the number of firms (N): 
E = E(N) --------------------------------------------- (2) 
According to Fox and Murry (1990), each firm assigns a welfare level, or rank for 
each geographic location. This welfare index depends on expected profits (7t), public 
infrastructure capital (G), and non-business taxes T 2, where each has an observable value. 
Therefore, the number of firms is a function of 7t, G, and T2: 
N = N ( 1t, G, T 2) ----------------------------------------------(3) 
This specification· shows that firms may not necessarily choose the· location that 
maximizes profits, because either the owner or the decision-making manager may choose 
the location because of the quality of life, or the burden of taxes that he expects to be 
paying from his personal income, even if it is not the location that maximizes profit. The 
quality of life is affected by G and T 2. 
A firm's profit function is given by: 
1t = P( D, S, Q) Q - C1 ( w, h, Q, G) - C2( T1) ------------------------ (4) 
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where Pis an inverse demand function, and is a function of market demand (D), number 
of competitors (S) and quantity (Q): w is input price vector, his labor productivity, and G 
is a set of public infrastructure capital stocks. Note that we have modified Fox and 
Murry's (1990) profit function, and instead of a per unit sales tax and a tax on inputs, the 
cost function is split into two parts, where C2 is a function of the vector of business taxes, 
T1. 
After evaluating all sites considered, a firm constructs a vector of indirect profit 
functions 1t*, composed of its valuation of expected profit at each site, and expressed in 
terms of parameters: 
7t* = 1t*( D, S, W, h, G, T1) -------------------------------------- (5) 
Substituting Eq(5) into Eq(3) and then the results of that into Eq (2) yields: 
E = E( D, S, w, h, G, T1, T2) ------------------------------------ (6) 
Note that our empirical model is going to be built on Eq (6). The state government agent 
has direct control on G,T1, and T2, but not on the other factors. 
: ..... ,,.,,.After -completing the discussion· on the specification issues· below~· tthe 
hypothesized channel ·and direction of the effects of each of the variables in Eq(6) will be 
discussed. Some other factors/variables that determine the effects of some of the variables 
in Eq(6), such·as market demand, will also be introduced. 
In the above framework, taxes and the provision/increases in public infrastructure 
capital stocks are mutually dependent. The state government agent chooses the optimal 
mix of taxes and the desired increases in the public infrastructure capital stock. This 
choice includes the decision of how much of increases (or improvement) in public 
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infrastructure capital is desired, and consequently how much additional tax revenue has to 
be collected. There is an optimal mix as between tax increases and public capital 
increases. The government official's choice also includes the .type or types of public 
infrastructure capital to be increased, on one hand, and the optimal mix of taxes, as 
between business and non-business taxes, on the other hand. The efficient mix in every 
choice is the one that has the most positive (or least negative)impact on firm location 
decisions. Firms react to the type of policy mix by moving into the state ( or jurisdiction), 
not moving in, moving out, not moving out, opening a new branch, or branches, or not 
opening a branch. 
Both the product and input markets are perfectly competitive. Private inputs are 
assumed to be geographically mobile. McLure (1970) explained the determinants of the 
degree of geographic mobility of private inputs and found that the geographic mobility of 
any factor can be expected to increase with time, and with the degree of perfection of 
markets, especially with respect to the availability and accessibility of information on 
geographic. differentials in earnings possibilities. ForAhe, ;purpose .of our mo~el, we 
assume that private inputs are geographically mobile, but not perfectly mobile. 
Regarding the existence of interstate differentials in taxes, as discussed in chapter 
I, evidence by ACIR (1981) and Wheaton (1983) and others indicate that there are 
interstate tax differentials, specially in business taxes. 
How independent variables are related to employment growth: · 
Now we tum to the factors/variables that affect the dependent variable 
"employment growth" in Eq(6); explain how each variable affects employment growth 
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( or firm location decisions) and thus what is the expected sign of that effect as suggested 
by theory. In the empirical model in Chapter N we explain how each variable is 
measured. 
The main factors that affect location decisions can be grouped as: 
(a) Business climate and public infrastructure. 
(b) Costs and availability of factors of production. 
( c) Market and environment. 
Considering the first group, the term "business climate", mainly refers to factors 
such as state and local taxes, laws, and labor unionization. So, group (a) includes public 
infrastructure capital stock and taxes. Public infrastructure includes non-military non-
residential structures and equipment including transportation facilities , such as streets, 
highways, railroads, canals, airports, and harbors; water and sewer treatment facilities and 
networks; communication systems; and education facilities. Currently, about 90% of 
infrastructure capital stocks is owned by state and local governments. So, as Gramlich 
(1994) stated, if infrastructure investment is a problem, it may be much more a state and 
local problem than a federal problem. Chapter II includes a detailed explanation of the 
potential channels through which public capital can affect the production and location 
decisions of a firm. As hypothesized by Meade (1952), public infrastructure can affect a 
firm's profitability as it enters the production process as an 'unpaid factor' of production 
and as an 'atmosphere factor' that augments the productivity of private inputs. The 
theoretical framework adopted for this study has the advantage of allowing for estimation 
of the total potential effect of public capital on economic growth, whether such effect is 
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mainly through its being an 'unpaid factor' or an 'augmenting factor' or both. The effect 
of state and local infrastructure capital stock on economic activity can be estimated as the 
effect of 'total' state and local infrastructure capital· stock. However, increases or 
improvements in some type(s) of such stock might be more effective than other types, i.e. 
the marginal benefit differs across types, depending on the age and condition of the 
existing stock, business and urban expansion. Therefore, the factors that affect firm 
location decisions and state and local employment growth include total state and local 
infrastructure capital stock as well as its types. Thus, the effects of types of public capital 
stock shall also be considered in estimation. 
. . 
Chapter IT of this study also includes a detailed explanation of how taxes can 
affect production and location decisions offirms. Business taxes are considered from 
firms' perspectives as costs. Therefore, total business taxes can cause locational 
differentials in business profitability. Total taxes paid by individuals also may influence 
location decisions of firms, because · firm owners or upper-level managers who make 
location decisions might take into account the tax bill that falls on · their individual 
incomes. These two types of tax bills are T2 and T1, respectively in Eq (6). On the basis of 
the above discussion, an increase in either of them is expected to have a negative impact 
on the number of firms and thus on employment growth in the state or local economy. 
Group (b) of the potential factors that affect the firm location decisions and thus 
employment growth, includes cost and availability of factors of production. Th~ most 
relevant factors include wages, energy costs, current unemployment level, level of. 
education, and welfare transfers. These shall be discussed in tum below. 
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Following Plaut and Pluta (1983), money capital is assumed to flow somewhat 
freely between states and localities, and, therefore, there is no considerable variation in 
the cost of money capital between geographic locations, since interest rates tend to almost 
equalize across regions. Therefore, the cost of money capital is not included with the 
variables that are expected to have a differential impact on the cost of businesses. It is 
worthwhile noting that it is the geographic differential in the factor cost that matters for 
the purpose of this study. Regarding the cost of money capital, the point is not the extent 
to which it matters to the cost side of the firm's profit function, but the extent to which it 
causes geographic profitability differential. 
The cost of labor is, of course, not only wage. There are other costs incurred by 
firms towards labor input. These include several types of fringe benefits provided to 
employees, cost of training, and insurances, among other things. Wages are used to 
measure the cost of labor because it.is the element that is, in general, expected to cause 
the major geographic labor cost differential. Since wages are costs to businesses, it is 
expected that the higher the wage, other Wn:gs b~ing equal, the lower the level of profits .. 
Another attribute of the labor market is the availability of labor. The state 
unemployment rate is used to represent the availability of labor. A high state 
unemployment rate indicates more availability of labor, and thus is expected to have a 
positive impact on business location decisions and thus employment growth. 
A third variable that is intended to represent the. labor market is the level of 
education as a measure of the quality of labor. This is represented by a measure of 
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university graduates as is explained in the empirical model, and 1s expected to .be 
positively related to the state employment growth rate. 
Another variable that is partly related to the availability of labor and partly related 
to the business climate, as well as to the market demand, is a measure of welfare. It is 
believed that some welfare programs have direct negative impact on the availability of 
labor, because of their negative impact on the incentive to work. However, there are other 
potential effects of the welfare programs on the business environment. To the extent that 
they create a lower rate of crime, a higher sense of altruism, and a positive effect on 
market demand, they would have a positive effect on business. However, it can be shown, 
in the empirical model that if the data is processed a certain way, a negative impact of 
welfare on employment growth would be expected. 
Two measures of energy costs are considered. One of them is the price of 
electricity and the other is a broader measure of energy from the various energy sources. 
Energy cost enters the cost part of the profit function, and thus, the sign of the coefficient 
of the energy measure/variable is expected to be negative. 
Group (c) of the potential factors that affect firm location decisions and the state 
employment growth, includes measures of market and climate. A measure of urban 
population is used to capture the size of the state and local market demand. This seems to 
be a reasonable indicator of the size of the state and local market. A considerable portion 
of the local demand is from the urban population, with a higher concentration of 
households and businesses, where services constitute a major part of small business 
activities. Such a variable is also a measure of agglomeration. So, for these reasons, it can 
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be hypothesized that this measure of urban population would be positively related to the 
state and local employment growth rate. 
Another important complementary · measure of the market demand could be 
personal income. However, although some other researchers included personal income, it 
does not,_seein appropriate to use this vanable on the right-hand-side of a regression 
equation that has as the dependent variable, in essence, a proxy for per capita income 
. - .·-"·. . . ., . ' . . ' . .· . . . . - . 
growth. So, personal income is not used as an explanatory variable in_ this study. 
· A measure of state temperature is used to represent the state climatic conditions. 
Such conditions are hypothesized to .. have implications on most of the aspects of business 
profitability, such as business costs through energy consumption for_ heating or cooling, as 
well as the costs and availability of labor{not only-wages),market demand, transportation 
costs, and · other considerations. Businesses located in the 'Snow' regions are 
hypothesized to incur more of such costs and thus negative impacts on markets and labor 
. . . 
availability than businesses located in the 'Sun' regions. Therefore, the above mentioned 
temperature measure/variable is expected to be positively related to state employment 
. ·~- ·.:•·_· • ~-·:··: • .·,. - :~:::, ' 1 > 1:~- .-1,_Li'.I,_, .. - · · :.·.'.· 
growth rate .. 




In this chapter, the first section presents the empirical model specification. The 
second section outlines the data construction and sources. The third section contains 
estimation procedures. 
Specification: 
On the basis of the underlying theoretical framework specified in the previous 
chapter, the goal is to specify an empirical model and to estimate it, using the relevant 
data, so that the potential effects of state and local public infrastructure capital stocks and 
taxes on employment growth can be estimated. 
Several economic indicators of economic development could be used, such as 
private productivity growth, gross state output growth, private capital stock growth, and 
employment growth, to estimate the impact of public capital and taxes on regional 
economic growth. However, as seen from empirical literature, and as indicated by 
DeRooy (1978) and Munnell (1990a), employment growth rate is the best measure of 
economic growth, and is the one that receives much attention by researchers, especially at 
the state level. So, based on the theoretical model and previous discussion, the empirical 
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model constructed is an employment growth model within the context of a firm location 
model. It examines the relationship between the state employment growth rate, as the 
dependent variable, and the independent variables that might explain the variability of . 
employment growth across states, as indicated in the theoretical model. 
On the basis of the theoretical model, the general econometric model is as 
follows: 
empgrow i = Po + P1 pubcap i + P2 bustax i + p3 indtax i + '34 wage i 
+Ps u 1 + P6 grad i + p, transfer i + Ps energ i ( or elect i ) 
+ P, urbani + P10 temp1+ ei ------------------------------- ('7) 
where empgrow i = [empgrow 1 ,empgrow 2 , •••••• , empgrow 43] is a 48 x 1 vector of 
observations on the employment growth rate. [f3o , ..• , f3 1o] is an 11 x 1 vector of 
unknown parameters, to be estimated; [ pubcap, .... , temp] is a 48x10 matrix of 
. . 
observations· on: the· ·explanatory variables; ·and·'e· {is a 48xl vector' of unknown, 
unobservable, random errors, satisfying the classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM) 
assumptions:--
1. E (ei) = 0, i.e. the mean vector of ei is zero. This implies that E(y i) = X~ 
where Xis the matrix of observations on the explanatory variables;~ is the vector 
of parameters as above. 
2. Cov(e) = E [ e e '] = <1 2 I 48 
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Assumptions (1) and (2) sate that the error terms are independently and identically 
distributed. The specification of identical variances of the random variables ( e 48) , and 
empgrow 48 , over all the 48 observations, i.e. E ( e 2 ) = O' 2 , says that the errors are 
specified as homoscedastic. ( Judge et. Al., 1988.) 
3. X ij is nonstochastic. 
Equation (7) is the general form of the econometric model to be estimated. There 
are several variations that are made to this general model. First, 'pubcap' is state and local 
total public capital stock. Another version of the model is formed by replacing 'pubcap' 
by different types of state . and local public capital stock, which are defined below. 
Second, equation . (7) does not include regional fixed-effect dummy-variables. Other 
versions of equation (7), as well as the one that replaces 'pubcap' with types of public 
capital stock, include intercept dummy variables (B0dj) to control for region-specific 
unobservable characteristics. B0dj is a vector of such intercept dummy variables, where j 
= MWD, SD, WD are abbreviations for the Mid-west, south, and west dummy variables. 
The :variables .included jn the.different versions of the econometric· model are 
defined as follows, where more detailed explanations are given in the data section (all are 
per state, and dollar amounts are in 1988 dollars) :--
Empgrow: average annual percentage change in private nonagricultural employment for 
the years 1988 to 1993 . 
. Pubcap: state and local total public capital stock, per non-farm employee, in the year 
1988. 
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Strehigh: state and local streets and highway public capital stock, per nonfarm employee, 
1988. 
Sewage: state and local public capital stock on water and sewer facilities 1988. 
Edu: state and local education public capital stock per nonfarm employee, 1988. 
Strswage = strehigh + sewage. 
Stredu, swgedu, strwgedu, restpubk are variables formed for the purpose of this study 
as strehigh + edu, sewage + edu, strehigh + sewage + edu, and pubcap - (strehigh + 
sewage+ edu), respectively. 
Bustax: sum of state business taxes, divided by corporate profit, 1988. 
Indtax: sum of taxes paid by individuals, divided by state personal income, 1988. 
Wage: average hourly wage in the manufacturing sector, 1988. 
U: state unemployment rate in 1988, defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census as the 
"percent unemployed of the civilian labor force" U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990). 
Grad: the number of university graduates per 100 persons aged 22 and over. So, it is the 
percent of population, in the mentioned age range, that have attained a graduate level, by 
1988. 
Transfer: the sum of AFDC + MIDICAID amounts paid by the state (as its share, i.e. not 
including the Federal share), per one thousand dollars of state personal income in 1988. 
Energ: the price of energy per million Btu's (British thermal units) in 1988. It is an 
average of the prices of energy from all different sources in the state. The Btu is defined 
in the Data section. 
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Elect: the price of electricity per million Btu, 1988. Note that either 'energ' or 'elect' will 
be used in a regression equ, but not both. 
Urban:% of state population residing in metropolitan areas in 1988. 
Temp: the normal daily maximum temperature for the month of July, 1988. 
The three assumptions stated earlier in this section, that E(e) = 0, Cov(e) = E[ee'] 
and Xij is nonstochastic, are necessary and sufficient for the Gauss-Markov theory to 
hold. Note that the fourth assumption for such theory to hold, i.e. Lim T -> oo X'Xff is 
finite and non-singular, is not assumed above because it is readily satisfied, on the basis 
of our calculations. The Gauss-Markov theory states that under the Classical Linear 
Regression Model (CLRM) assumptions: b(OLS), i.e. Ordinary Least Squares estimator 
is the best linear unbiased estimator of fl 
There are four basic issues that have to be addressed here. The first has to do with 
the a priori linear specification. A linear statistical model means ''that the specification is 
linear in the unknown parameters but not necessarily linear in the treatment of the 
• ',1..;. • ........ , •. ···-- •. ' 
explanatory variables." [Judge et. Al. 1978 p. 185] As explained in the estimation section, 
a form.al test, "Mackinnon-White-Davidson", or in abbreviation form "MWD", test 
(Gujarati, 1995) is performed for one version of the general model to select the correct 
functional form, either linear or log-linear. The other versions are then checked by 
inspection of standard errors. 
Second, the parameters of the model are estimated by use of cross-sectional data, 
since "location decisions of economic agents are long term in nature and inferences about 
long-term behavior are more appropriate from cross-section analysis," (DeRooy 1978, p. 
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48.) fu the disequilibrium-adjustment model, the change in the dependent variable 
throughout the period is regressed on the levels of the explanatory variables at the 
beginning of the period. It is assumed that differences in non-farm profitability are large 
enough to cause differences in the rates of non-farm growth. This is the key assumption 
behind the disequilibrium adjustment model. It is based on the assumption of initial 
locational disequilibrium. The disequilibrium adjustment model, as explained by Plaut 
and Pluta: 
"is commonly used in cross-sectional studies of regional growth. In 
each regression, the change in the dependent variable over the 
period is related to the levels of tie independent variables at the 
beginning of the period. The independent variables in the 
regressions capture differentials in manufacturing profitability 
across states: differentials in manufacturing profitability then cause 
differentials in the rate of industrial expansion across states." 
(Plant and Pluta, 1983, p.102) 
Cross-sectional data, explained below, is thus used to estimate our empirical model. 
Third, OLS is selected is selected to estimate the model. According to Gauss-
Markov theorem, under the CLRM assumptions, its estimator, the vector b, is BLUE, i.e. 
best linear unbiased estimator. There are two requirements for the selection of OLS. The 
first is homoscedasticity, i.e. E(e2i) = er 2 for all i. This means the error terms have 
identical variances over all observations. Heteroscedasticity is likely to exist in economic 
cross-section data, because large errors are likely to be associated with large observation 
units while small errors tend to be associated with small observation units. (Judge et. Al, 
. 1988, p. 327). The consequence of heteroscedasticity is that, if it exists and is ignored, 
OLS vector of estimations would still be unbiased, but not the best, i.e. not efficient. 
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Then, t and F tests would be misleading. Formal tests are thus performed in this study for 
checking for heteroscedasticity. 
The other assumption to be checked regards the possibility that each cross-section 
unit has a different coefficient vector. When such situation occurs, or when errors of 
different observation units at the same time period are correlated, (i.e. contemporaneous 
correlation), the OLS estimation would not be efficient, and seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) estimator is used. In order to test the structural stability of the model, 
the Chow test is performed. The results of such test indicate whether or not it is necessary 
to use slope dummy variables for sample partitions, to allow for differences in 
coefficients. As is explained in Judge (1988, p. 468), this is a simple and appropriate way, 
especially for cross-sectional data. fu this case, since slope dummy variables are already 
used, there is no need for testing for contemporaneous correlation. 
The above explanation completes the discussion on the choice of OLS, and thus it 
is concluded that OLS is chosen because under the specified procedures, its estimator 
vector remains BLUE according to Gauss-Markov theory. Other tests, regarding other 
issues, are outlined in the estimation section. 
The fourth basic issue associated with the estimation of our main model involves 
. controlling for region-specific unobservable characteristics. Such controls are either 
performed by a random effects model (REM) or a Least Squares Dummy Variable 
(LSDV) model. The REM is appropriate when the individuals on which we have data are 
considered as a random sample from a larger population and we are interested in 
inferences about the population. If such individuals cannot be considered as a random 
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sample from a larger population, or we are interested in those individuals only, then 
LSDV is appropriate. (Judge et. al.1988, p.489). The REM treats the region-specific 
effects as random effects. The LSDV model treats the region-specific effects as fixed 
effects. LSDV model is thus a fixed-effects model (FEM). The LSDV model just 
introduces an intercept dummy variable for each group (on cross-section), or region as in 
our model, and then estimation proceeds by OLS. The LSDV estimator is BLUE. (Judge 
et. Al. 1988 p. 489). Since the states constitute all 48 contiguous states, and we are not 
interested in inferences about a larger population, and the states are not a random drawing 
from a larger population, FEM (LSDV) is appropriate for our case. 
The data for estimating the multiple regression model of this study is cross-
sectional. On the basis of the disequilibrium-adjustment model, the dependent variable, 
which is the average annual growth rate of private non-agricultural employment over the 
period, is regressed on the levels of the explanatory variables at the beginning of the 
period. 
''Public spending' s effects on economic development would be 
expected to occur only gradually over time. This assumption is 
implicit when using public capital as the measure of public 
services. Measured public capital at any point in time is simply 
some complex distributed lag function of past public capital 
investment. Public spending on other public services such as 
education may also have effects on economic development only 
after a considerable lag. In the case of education, the quality of 
educational services may not improve until some years after an 
increase in funding. After educational quality has improved, it will 
take some time for the quality of the local labor force to improve. 
Similar arguments can be made for other types of public spending. 
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Hence, all estimates of the effects of different types of public 
spending allow for public spending in a given year to have effects 
on economic development up to 11 years later. Taxes are also 
allowed to have up to an 11-year lagged effect." (Bartik, 1996, 
p.42.) 
Public capital stock data used is for the year 1988. This allows the calculations of 
average annual private nonagricultural employment growth rates for up to 8 years. The 11 
year period is the maximum to which tangible·effects of public spending are expected to 
extend. However, a period up to 8 years is satisfactory. Several time periods are 
considered in the e~timation since the period in which public capital spending might have 
considerable effects is unknown. Specifically, the dependent variable is measured . as the 
average annual percentage change in private nonagricultural employment for the years 
.. . . 
1988-1995 ·(or 1988-1994, 198.8-1993; etc.) for each of the 48 contiguous states. The 
... 
levels of the explanatory variables on which the average nonagricultural employment 
growth rate is regressed are for the year 1988. 
The chqice of using private nonagricultural sector as the dependent variable is a 
matter of both ayailabi_lity and accuracy of data, as· well as the notion that the effects of 
'.?_·_r~~_:_',fLV i;;'· ,.;:.: · . 
state and local public infrastructure capital stock and spending are usually more manifest 
in such sectors. Source for data on the state-by-state annual private non-farm employment 
is the U.S. Bureau of.the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1991-1996. 
The percentage change in employment growth is calculated for each year, and the average 
growth rate is calculated for each of the periods considered in the .study. 
Public infrastructure includes non-military non-residential structures and 
equipment including transportation facilities , such as streets, highways, railroads, canals, 
73 
airports, and harbors; water and sewer treatment facilities and networks; communication 
systems; and education facilities. 
The state-by-state public capital stock estimates are constructed by Holtz-Eakin 
(1993) for the year 1988. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) constructs total public 
and private capital stocks at the national level each year. However, state-by-state 
estimates of public and private capital stocks were unavailable until recent years. The 
BEA also publishes nominal annual public capital investment flows for each state. Holtz-
Eakin used that investment data, after deflating it by the BEA deflator for purchases of 
structures by state-local governments, and calculated public capital stock estimates 
following the BEA perpetual inventory approach used in constructing similar measures at 
the national level. To provide a benchmark capital stock at the state level, the BEA 
national aggregate real net capital stock for the state-local sector for the U.S. as a whole is 
apportioned to each state. Then the level of public capital investment flow is related to the 
capital stock through the common scale effect. Depreciation rates are computed, capital 
accumulation is valuated, and the process continues until total public capital stocks are 
calculated for each state. The state level data is then disaggrgated for the state arid local 
level separately, to provide information for the different levels of government. For 
detailed explanation of the procedures involved, refer to Holtz-Eakin ( 1993). 
The state and local public capital stock variables used in this study are listed and 
defined in the previous section, and include total state and local public capital stock as 
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well as the different categories of state and local capital stock. ( The Appendix to this 
chapter includes a summary of the variables used in this study.) 
The variable "bustax" is defined as the sum of state business taxes for 1988 
divided by corporate profits for that year. This does not include all of the taxes paid by 
businesses, but the major taxes paid by businesses. The items left out of the calculations 
. are left out due to unavailability of data or lack of data that can be used for apportioning 
the tax to the to business and non-business sectors. However, the items left out from 
calculations of the data for this tax variable are of small magnitude and are left out also 
from the calculations of "indtax." 
State total property tax revenue is available from ACIR publications. However, no 
data is available for state and local business property taxes or the business share of the 
total for 1988. The most recent year for which property tax revenue is reported for types 
of property taxes, i.e. residential, industrial, farm and public utilities, is 1983 (ACIR, 
1986,;pp. 89-93). Assuming that all residential property tax is non-business tax, all public 
utilities and farm taxes are business taxes, total property taxes revenue for 1988 is 
apportioned to business and nonbusiness (i.e. to 'bustax' and 'indtax'), based on the 1983 
breakdown. Therntio of state and local tax revenue from residential property to total state 
and local property tax revenue for 1983 is calculated by dividing such tax revenues, 
respectively, for that year. The ratio is used for apportioning state and local total property 
tax revenue for 1988. The data for 1988 is from ACIR (1991, p. 56). 
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State and local general sales tax revenues per state for 1988 are from ACIR (1991, 
p. 34). They are apportioned to business and non-business taxes using an index created 
by Ring (1989) for the consumers' share of state and local general sales taxes for the year 
1979. 
Data for corporate profit, corporation license, and severance tax revenues for 1988 
is directly from ACIR (1991, p. 55, p. 48, and p. 60, respectively.) 
Thus, data for the variable "bustax" is calculated for each state by adding the 
property, general sales, corporate profit, license and revenue taxes paid by the business 
sector. The sum is scaled by dividing it by the state corporate profit for 1988, which is 
available from the same source as that for the corp_oration profit tax. 
The data for the variable "indtax" is calculated in a similar manner. It is thus 
calculated by taking the sum: residential property tax revenue + revenue from sales tax 
on consumer goods + individual income tax, and scaling such sum by dividing it by state 
personal income tax' ~e;enue. 
'Wage' is used to represent the cost oflabor. It is measured as the hourly wage for 
the manufacturing sector (as a proxy for non-manufacturing sector) for 1988. The source 
of data is U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical· Abstract of the United States, 1994, 
p.762. ;_; ____ _.,_ . 
The state unemployment rate in 1988, U%, is used to represent the availability of 
labor. It is defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census as the 'percent unemployed of the 
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civilian labor force.'(U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 
· 1990). 
The variable 'Grad' is used as a measure of labor quality. It defined as the number 
of university graduates per 100 persons aged 22 and over in a state. So, it is the 
percentage of state population, in the mentioned age range, that has attained a graduate 
level. The source for this data is: National Center for Education Statistics, Education in 
States and Nations, 1993, p. 61. 
The variable 'transfer' is used as a measure of welfare transfers in a state. Using 
the total welfare amount does not seem appropriate for measuring the effect of welfare 
transfers on firm location. The variable 'transfer' is calculated for the purpose of this 
study, in a manner different from previous studies, as AFDC+ MEDICAID paid by the 
state (as its share, not including the federal share) as per $1000 of state personal income. 
Plaut and Pluta (1983), and others, used total welfare (including the federal share and 
items of other welfare programs) and their results gave a positive sign for the welfare 
coefficient. This was unexpected classified welfare as a government expenditure that is 
undesirable by firms and expected a negative sign, However, a positive sign should not be 
a surprise to them. They used data that should be expected to give a positive sign from the 
individual state's perspective, because some of the major welfare programs are wholly 
funded by the federal government and thus exogenous to a state, other things being equal, 
and the rest of the programs are on the average funded to over 50% by the federal 
government. I expect the sign and magnitude of the coefficient of the variable 'transfer' to 
be a good indicator of the effect of welfare transfers in the context of the firm location 
model. The sources used in calculating such data are : (1) U. S. Bureau of the Census, 
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Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1990, 1991, and: (2) Social Security Bulletin, 
Annual Statistical Supplement, 1989, p.82, and 1990, pp. 283,315. 
The variable 'Energ' is used to measure energy cost in a state. It is the price of 
energy per million Btu's (British thermal units.) A Btu is defined by the U.S. Energy 
Information and Administration as the amount of energy required to raise the temperature 
of 1 pound of water I degree F (Fahrenheit) at or near 39.2 degrees F. So, the variable 
'energ' is an average of the prices of energy from all different sources in the state. The 
source of data is U. S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, State 
Energy Price and Expenditure Report. 'Elect' is the price of electricity per million Btu's. 
The data source is the same as for the energy variable. Either 'Energ' or 'elect' will be 
used in a regression, but not both. 
"Urban" is used a measure of market demand. It is defined as the percentage of 
state population residing in metropolitan areas in 1988. Data for urban population figures 
are available only for 1970, 1980 and 1990. However, urban population and metropolitan 
population figures are very close to each other. Munnell (1990a) used the percentage of 
• . • -_ • ~' ! 
state population residing in metropolitan areas and called that variable "URBAN''. The 
same approach will be taken in this study. Data is taken from the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1990, p. 28. 
'Temp' is the normal daily maximum temperature for the month of July. It is used 
to approximate the state climatic conditions that might affect business and household 
location decisions. Data is taken from U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of 
the United States, 1994, p. 239. 
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Estimation Procedures: 
On the basis of the underlying theoretical model, the empirical model is specified 
in.the first section of this chapter. The goal is to estimate the empirical model, using the 
data described in the previous .section, to look at the effects of state and local public 
infrastructure capital stocks and taxes on private non-agricultural employment growth. To 
achieve this goal, several models are estimated, using appropriate software procedures. 
_,.A • • •• • -
The following subsections outline those models,.procedures and tests performed. 
Regression equations: 
. . ' 
On the basis of the. study problem and · objectives outlined in chapter I, several · 
empirical models ate estimated. (The-following equations are calledregression equations 
- ·. ; . . ,•.: .•· '...- . ' ·' -
each time to differentiate them from the numbered equations of the theoretical model) 
They are different variations of _the gener~ .econometric model, equation (7): 
empgrow .i = f3o + 131 pubcap i + f3lbustax i + (33 indtax i + '34 wage i 
+f3s u i + J36 grad i + (3, transfer i + f3s energ i ( or elect i ) 
---~~.:~~~/ . U.f0!1i:"! ff~.-·{if}: .-i\t,Si.;·°d:.!. · 
-------.----------.. -----.. ------- (7) 
Regression equation '(tJ:· "- -, ··· -- - · - · 
First; one regression is fitted, including the variables in equation (7), and 
estimated, with state and local public capital stock as total, not disaggregated to types,. 
and without controlling for fixed effects. · 
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empgrow i = 130 + 131 pubcap i + 132 bustax i + l33 ind taxi + l34 wage i 
+13s u i + 136 grad i + 131 transfer i + 13s energ i ( or elect i) 
+ l39 urban i + 1310 tempi ................................... Reg. Eq. (1) 
Regression equation (2): 
Second, a regression equation, which is same as regression equation (1) but with 
fixed effects (intercept) dummy variables, is fitted and estimated. 
empgrow i = Po+ f31 MWD + f32 WD + (33 SD + l34 pubcap i 
+ f3s bustax i + (36 ind taxi + 131 wage i + f3s u i 
+ (39 grad i + 1310 transfer i + Pu energ i ( or elect i ) 
+ 1312 urban i + (313 .tempi ..................... Reg. Eq.(2) 
Regression equation (3) : 
This is the same as equation (2), but with "bustax" as the only tax variable; :The 
"indtax" variable is dropped because it proved to be insignificant. in equation (2). 
empgrow i = f3o + f31 MWD + f32 WD + (33 SD + l34 pubcap i 
+ 13s bustax i + (36 wage i + 131 u i + 13s grad i 
+ l39 transfer i + 1310 energ i ( or elect i ) + 1311 urban i 
+ 1312 tempi ....................................... Reg. Eq.(3) 
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Regression equation (4) is the same as equation (2), but with state and local public 
capital stocks disaggregated to types. So, the variable "pubcap" is replaced with the types 
of public capital defined in the empirical model in the first section of this chapter. 
Regression equation (5) is the same as regression equation (4), but with 'bustax' as the 
only tax variable. Again, the "indtax" variable is dropped, because it was insignificant in 
the results of equation (4). 
Regression equation (6) is the same as (5), but with slope dummy variable for 
"strwgedu". Like other regression equations, this is reached through several runs where 
slope dummy variables were introduced to all variables and found to be significant for 
"strwgedu" only. More detailed explanation is given in the procedure section below. 
Regression equation (7) is the same as ( 6), but it includes "strwedlo" which is the 
variable "strwgedu" for the cross-section of observations that includes the 25 lowest per-
capita income states, group "Lo". This is explained in the procedure section below. 
Regression equation (8) is the same as (7), but it replaces "strwedhi", which is the 
variable "strwgedu" for the 23 highest per capita income states, group "Hi", with 
"strswahi". 
Regression equation (9) is the same as (8), but it replaces "strwedhi" with "strhi", ch is 












Summary of Variables Included in the Regression Equations 
Equation Variables included 
pubcap , bustax , indtax , wage , u , grad , transfer , energ , 
urban, temp 
MWD , WD , SD , pubcap , bustax , indtax , wage , u , grad , 
transfer , energ , urban , temp 
MWD , WD , SD , pubcap , bustax , wage , u , grad , 
transfer , energ , urban , temp 
MWD , WD , SD , bustax , indtax , wage , u , grad , 
transfer , energ , urban , temp , strwgedu 
MWD , WD , SD , bustax , wage , u , grad , transfer , 
energ , urban , temp , strwgedu 
MWD , WD , SD , bustax , wage , u , grad , transfer , 
energ , urban , temp , strwedlo 
MWD , WD , SD , bustax , wage , u , grad , transfer , 
energ , urban , temp , strwedhi 
MWD , WD , SD , bustax , wage , u , grad , transfer , 
energ , urban , temp , strswahi 
MWD , WD , SD , bustax , wage , u , grad , transfer , 
energ , urban , temp , strhi 
Estimation is conducted and various software procedures are used to compare the 
statistics and explanatory power of variables and to select the size and composition of the 
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model that best explains the variability in the dependent variable. The "stepwise" 
procedure, as explained by SAS Guide ( Helwig, 1978 p.69), performs stepwise 
regression by entering the independent variable one by one into the regression equation in 
a way to maximize the explained variability and at the same time economize in the 
number of independent variables entered. This helps to avoid over or under specification. 
Stepwise by itself does not determine the appropriate specification, but the stepwise 
results are used along with different test results to avoid over or under specification. 
For each of the regression equations (1) to (9) a stepwise procedure is used to 
perform a stepwise regression, with all of the explanatory variables included in the pool 
of explanatory variables from which the stepping is done. The pool or group of candidate 
explanatory variables for each of the regression equations is indicated in the preceding 
section on regression equations. In each regression equation, a set of variables is included. 
These comprise the variables of interest, which are state and local public capital stock or 
tax variables. Then, the stepwise procedure steps into the regression other independent 
variables one by one in the manner described above. The independent variables forced in 
the regression equation are as follows: 
Regression equation No. Independent variables forced in 
1 pubcap bus tax ind tax 
2 pubcap bus tax ind tax 
3 pubcap bus tax 












As from regression equation (5) to regression equation (9), the public capital stock 
is disaggregated and is not in total. So the variables of public capital types are not forced 
in, but left for the stepwise procedure to select from them. 
To avoid over or underspecification, Durbin-Watson 'd' and Ramsey Reset II tests 
are used as model specification tests. On the basis of the stepwise results, and these 
model specification tests, as well as the other tests outlined in the following subsection, 
model selection is made, and the regression equations (1) to (9) are fitted. 
Many executions of stepwise are done with state-fixed controls as intercept 
dummy variables for individual states, taken one at a time, as well as several at a time, in 
a way to preserve degrees of freedom. However, individual state fixed effects dummy 
variables are not found statistically significant, but the results of the group intercept 
dummy variables tended towards significance of regional fixed effects. Thus, the regional 
fixed effects dummy variables were included in regression equations (2) to (9). It is worth 
noting that it made no difference whether region intercept dummy variables are forced in 
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the regression equation a priori or they are stepped in by the stepwise procedure. In other 
words if not forced, they are stepped in and statistically significant in all cases. 
Regression equations (6) to (9) include slope dummy variables. Slope dummy 
variables are introduced to all independent variables and found statistically significant 
only for the variables included in these equations. The purpose of including these dummy 
variables is to test the validity of our claim about the inappropriateness of averaging the 
effects of taxes and public infrastructure capital stock across states, even after controlling 
for unobservable state or region-specific characteristics by intercept-shift dummy 
variables that prove significant. 
Then the states are arranged in an order according to the level of growth 
attained by 1988, measured by state per capita income. A formal structural stability test, 
the Chow test, ( see Gujarati,1995), is performed to the complete model (of 48 states) 
after including the dummy variables for intercept change across regions. Such test takes 
alternative groupings of arranged observations and finds if structural stability fails at 
, certain sub groupings. The results of the Chow test indicate that the slope parameters 
change, with groups 23, and 25, of the ordered observations. Since the states are ordered 
according to the level of growth from higher to lower, we call the first group of 23, at the 
end of which the system is dichotomous, group 'Hi', and the remaining states, group 'Lo'. 
It is more efficient to still estimate the model with the 48 states introducing slope dummy 
variables for one group. (Judge et. al., 1988.) This is what is done in regression equations 
(6) to (9). More detailed explanations of such equations are given in the next chapter. 
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Tests: 
A Mackinnon-White-Davidson "M-W-D" test is performed for the selection of the 
appropriate functional form. The result is a linear specification of the empirical model. 
In small samples, the t, F, and Chi Square tests require the normality assumption. 
(Gujarati, 1995, p.145.) A normality test is performed for each of the estimated regression 
equations. The software program calculates statistics of Jarque-Bera and Chi Square tests 
of normality, as well as Skewness-Kurtosis-Omnibus tests. All the regression models 
estimated have sufficiently passed the first two tests of normality, and there was no need 
for Skewness-Kurtosis, which is usually used if the other tests failed. 
As discussed in the empirical specification section, in order for the Gauss-Markov 
theory to be valid, and thus the OLS estimator to be BLUE, one of the assumptions that 
has to be valid is that the error terms should have identical variances over all 
observations. Then there is no significant presence of heteroscedasticity. 
Heteroscedasticity is likely to exist in economic data, specifically cross-sectional data. 
The Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test is sensitive to the assumption of normality, especially in 
small sample observations. However, that does not constitute a problem since we have 
already tested for normality. Both B-P-G and Glejser tests are used, and there is a 
presence of heteroscedasticity but not of a serious or significant level. 
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Because the independent variables are measured at the beginning of the period, 
there is no need for simultaneous-equation estimation. Endogeniety is unlikely to occur 
in the equilibrium adjustment mechanism used in this study. 
Both Durbin-Watson 'd' and Ramsey Reset II tests are used to test for model 
specification error. These test for over-specification, or the inclusion of extraneous 
variables, or underspecification, which is the exclusion of significant relevant variables. 
These tests were already used for model selection during the stepwise process, rather than 
being used to check for the specification after the model is selected or fitted. 
It is already explained above that the Chow test is used for testing the structural 
stability of the models. A Klein rule-of-thumb test is used for testing for 
multicollinearity. It indicates no serious presence of multicollinearity in the models 
without dummy variables. Multicollinearity usually becomes high when slope dummy 
variables are used, but that is unavoidable. 
Overall, no corrective procedures were needed for any estimation problem. 
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Variable Definition 
Appendix ~ Chapter IV 
Summary of Variables 
Empgrow: Average annual percentage change in private 
nonagricultural employment for the years 1988 to 
1983. 
Source & Year 
U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Statistical 
Abstract of the United 
States, 1991-1996. 
2 Pubcap State and local total public capital stock, per non-farm Holtz-Eakin (1993) 
employee, in the year 1988 
3 Strehigh State and local streets and highway public capital Holtz-Eakin (1993) 
stock, per nonfarm employee ·· 
4 Sewage State and local public capital stock on water and sewer Holtz-Eakin (1993) 
facilities per nonfann employee, 1988 
5 Edu State an_q local education public capital stock per Holtz-Eakin (1993) 
nonfarm employee, 1988 
6 Strswage 3+4 Holtz-Eakin (1993) 
7 Stredu 3+5 Holtz-Eakin (1993) 
8 Swgedu 4+5 Holtz~Eakin (1993) 
9 strwged 3+4+5 Holtz-Eakin (1993) 
10 Restpubk 2-'9 Holtz-Eakin (1993) 
11 Bustax Sum of states business taxes, divided by corporate ACIR (1988-1991) 
profit, 1988. 
12 lndtax Sum of taxesw paid by individuals , divided by state ACIR (1988-1991) 
personal income, 1988. 
13 Wage 
14 U 
Average hourly wage in the manufacturing 
sector, 1988. 
State unemployment rate: percent unemployed of the 
civilian labor force. 
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U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Statistical 
Abstract of the United 
States, 1994; p.762. 
U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Statistical 


















15 Grad Number of university graduates per 100 persons aged National Center for Positive 
22 and over. Education Statistics, 
Education in States and 
Nations, 1993, p. 61. 
16 Transfer Sum of AFDC + MIDICAID amounts paid by the state Social Security Bulletin, Negative 
(as its share, i.e. not including the Federal share), per 
one thousand dollars of state personal income in 1988 
Annual Statistical 
Supplement,1989, 1990. 
17 Energ Price of energy pe't million. Btu's (British thermal U. S. Department of Negative 
units) in 1988. It-is an average of the prices of energy Energy, State Energy 
from all different sources in the state. The Btu is Price and Expenditure 
defined in the Data section. Report , 1990. 
18 Elect Price of electricity per million Btu, 1988. Note that U.S. Department of Negative 
either 'energ' or 'elect' will be used in a regression Energy, State Energy 
equ, but not both. Price and Expenditure 
Report .1990. 
19 Urban Percentage of state population residing in metropolitan U.S. Bureau of the Positive 
areas in 1988. Census, Statistical 
Abstract of the United 
States, 1990. 
20 Temp The normal daily maximum temperature for the month U.S. Bureau of the Positive 
ofJuly, 1988. Census, Statistical 




RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The first section in this chapter presents regression results and analysis of the 
coefficients of public infrastructure capital stocks and taxes. It presents the general results 
for such variables of primary interest, explains the coefficient magnitudes, discusses what 
they indicate, and calculates the (balanced-budget) net effects of tax increases used to 
finance infrastructure increases. The second section presents and discusses the 
coefficients of the rest of the explanatory variables. 
Infrastructure and Taxes: 
Results: 
In each of the nine regression equations estimated, the F-statistic indicates 
significance of the regression, with p-value of zero. Estimation results show reasonable 
precision, where almost all of the standard errors of estimates are of less magnitudes than 
the corresponding coefficients of estimates, and in each of the final models [(3),(5),(7),(8) 
and (9)] all of the standard errors are much smaller than the corresponding coefficient 
estimates. The R2 is 0. 58 for regression equation (1). This is considered reasonably high 
since the model is explaining changes, and not levels, of the dependent variable. (Plaut 
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and Pluta, 1983). The R2 values for the equations with dummy variables are quite large, 
and that is due to the dummy variables, and does not reflect how much variability is 
explained. In general, the results are in line with what is expected on the basis of the 
theoretical model. 
The results of regression equations(3), (5), and (7) are reported in Table 1, Table 
2, and Table 3, respectively. The results of regression equations(!), (2), (4),(6),(8), and 
(9) are included in Appendix A-1. 
In regression equation (1) state and local public capital stock is entered as total, 
not disaggregated to types. No intercept dummy variables are used to control for region-
or state-specific fixed effects. As seen in. Table A-1-1 in Appendix A-1, the coefficient 
of the variable 'pubcap' is positive and statistically significant at 8% level. The 
coefficient of 'bustax' is negative, but not statistically significant. The coefficient of 
'indtax' is positive (wrong sign) and not statistically significant. This poor performance is 
probably due to the failure to control for region or state unobservable characteristics. 
Regression Equation (2) is the same as regression equation (1), but with fixed 
effects (intercept) dummy variables. Intercept dummy variables are introduced for the 
four regions, but technically only three dummy variables are included to avoid the 
'dummy variable trap'. (Judge et al 1988; Gujarati 1995). But that does not mean that we 
have not controlled for the four regions. We have, since there is an overall intercept used 
for the fourth region. Estimation with this fixed effects model (FEM), which is the Least 
Squares Dummy Variable model (LSDV), yields a better performance than the results of 
regression equation (1). The results of this estimation are reported in Table A-1-2 in 
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Appendix A-1. All coefficients are statistically significant except those of 'pubcap' and 
'indtax'. However, the positive coefficient on 'pubcap' and the negative coefficient on 
indtax' are as expected. Note that all the intercept dummy variables for regions are 
statistically significant, with p-values of zero. 
Results of regression equation (3) are reported in Table 1 below. This regression 
equation is the same as equation (2) but with 'indtax' dropped, since its coefficient in 
regression equation (2) is not statistically significant. All coefficients are statistically, 
significant at 5% level except 'pubcap' coefficient. 
In the results of regression equation (1), 'pubcap' was statistically significant at 
8% level. In the results of regression equation (3), 'pubcap' is not statistically significant 
even at 20% level. These results indicate that, when controlling for region-specific 
unobservable fixed effects, the coefficient of 'pubcap' becomes statistically less 
significant. This supports the trend in previous research, and especially Holtz-Eakin's 
(1992) argument that when controlling for fixed effects, the effect of state and local 
"total" public· capital stock on .state. economic development becomes insignificant. or at 
least less significant. 
The results of regression equation (4) are reported in Table A-1-3 of Appendix A-
l. This regression equation is the same as equation (2), but instead of state and local 
"total" public capital stock 'pubcap', a type of state and local public capital 'strwgedu' is 
used. 'Strwgedu' is state and local public capital stock for streets-highways-sewage and 
education. Actually, it includes three types together. However, it is the variable that is 
stepped into the regression equation by the stepwise procedure. In Table A-1-3 of 
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Appendix A-1, the only two variables that are not statistically significant are 'indtax' and 
'strwgedu'. The coefficient of the variable 'indtax' has a much smaller t-ratio than 
'strwgedu' and thus 'indtax' is dropped. 
Table 1 
Results of Regression Equation (3) 
Variable Estimated Coefficient Standard Error T-ratio p-value 
MWD 1.9023 0.3796 5.012 0.000 
SD 1.3576 0.3915 3.468 0.001 
WD 3.1602 0.3984 7.932 0.000 
pubcap 0.000051448 0.00004613 1.115 0.272 
bus tax -1.5177 0.6497 2.336 0.025 
wage -0.26232 0.1215 -2.160 0.037 
energ -0.31672 0.1278 -2.478 0.018 
urban -0.014324 0.005722 -2.503 0.017 
temp 0.056408 0.02389 2.361 0.023 
constant 0.88251 2.919 0.3023 0.764 
Dropping 'indtax', as explained above, gives us regression equation (5), the 
results of which are reported in Table 2 below. The results of equation (5) indicate that 
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the only insignificant coefficient is that of 'strwgedu'. Although this regression equation 
(5) is reached by dropping 'indtax' from equation (4), it is also reached by direct 
stepwise, where this equation is ranked the best, with 'strwgedu' included in it with the 
same coefficient and t-ratio. 
Table 2 
Results of Regression Equation (5) 
Variable Estimated Coefficient Standard Error T-ratio p-value 
MWD 1.8645 0.3800 4.907 0.000 
SD 1.3987 0.3881 3.604 0.001 
WD 3.1767 0.3926 8.092 0.0000 
bus tax -1.4559 0.5564 -2.617 0.013 
wage -0.25254 0.1182 -2.136 0.039 
energ -0.31087 0.1269 -2.449 0.019 
urban -0.012487 0.006053 -2.063 0.046 
temp 0.054641 0.02366 2.310 0.026 
strwgedu 0.000060308 0.00004594 1.313 0.197 
constant 0.7942 2.895 0.2743 0.785 
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Estimating regression equation (5) without the intercept dummy variables shows 
that the coefficient of strwgedu is 0.000119 and its t-ratio is 1.663. These are higher than 
the results shown in Table (2). This indicates that when controlling for fixed effects the 
impact of public capital stock on employment growth becomes less significant. 
Regression equation (6) is the same as regression equation (5), but with the 
introduction of a slope dummy variable for 'strwgedu'. Slope dummy variables are found 
significant only for the capital variable. The results of regression equation (6), reported in 
Table A-1-4 in Appendix A-1, show that 'strwgedu' is statistically significant for the 'Hi" 
group. This includes the first 23 states in the descending order of states arranged 
according to the level of growth attained by 1988. It is not significant for the 'Lo' group. 
Dropping the variable 'strwedlo' (dropping 'strwgedu' for 'Lo') results in 
regression equation (7). The results of regression equation (7) are reported in Table 3 
below. All variables are statistically significant at 5% level. The coefficient of the capital 
variable is positive and significant at the 5% level. 
Regression equation (8) is the same ,as regression.equation (7), · but 'strwgedu' is 
replaced by 'strswage'. This breaks down public· capital even further into separate types. 
The results of regression equation (8) are reported in Table A-1-5 in Appendix A-1. 
When 'strswage' is broken down to two types, streets/highways and sewage, the 
coefficient on the streets/highways variable is statistically significant for the 'Hi' group at 




· Results of Regression Equation {7) 
Variable Estimated Coefficient Standard Error T-ratio p-value 
MWD 1.8309 0.3682 4.973 0.000 
SD 1.3722 0.3763 3.646 0.001 
WD 3.2812 0;3783 8.673' 0.000 
bus tax -0.94994 0.3893 -2.440 ·0.019 
wage -0.28632 ·~ .. 0:1167 -2.454 · · 0.019 
energ -0.43042 0.1246 · · .:3_455 0.001 
urban -0.019483 0.005730. -3.400 0.002 
temp 0.064213· 0.02346 2.737 0.009 
strwedhi 0.000044408 ·- ... 0.00002152 2.064 · 0.064 
constant 1.9248 2~734, , 0.7018 0.487 
. ;: ' . ! ~ ~-: ~ : .. -
~ ' ' . . ; :"- .. !"!:t:" r···1· 
The results of either or all of regression equations (7),(8), and (9) indicate that the 
assumption that' state, ·of region: unobserved characteristics can aii be included in the 
intercept by introducing·intercept·dummy variables, and :that the slope parameters are the 
.· . . . ' .· 
same for all observations, does not seem appropriate. When the slope dummy variables 
are introduced, the public capital Stock variable has positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for the 'Hi' group, but not for the 'Lo' group of states. This suggests that, 
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when estimating the mean effect of public capital stock on employment growth, 
researchers are averaging effects across states, which might differ in their hierarchies of 
needs. 
The results of regression equations (7) to (9) also indicate that the type or types of 
state and local public capital stock that have statistically significant coefficients are 
infrastructure types, mainly streets/highways and sewage. This supports some of the 
previous evidence cited in the literature review. It is possible that the 'Hi' group of states 
might be experiencing "bridge collapses, water main explosions, crumbling condition and 
catastrophic infrastructure failures", (Munnell 1990a), at a higher rate than the 'Lo' 
group of states. Greater deterioration of the public infrastructure in the 'Hi' group of 
states suggests that the gains from investment in public infrastructure are higher in thses 
states. The estimation results thus indicate that the marginal benefit, in terms of private 
non-agricultural employment growth, from public investment in streets/highways and 
sewage infrastructure is higher, and significantly different, in 'Hi' group than in the 'Lo' 
group. This supports the assertion by Eberts and Dalenberg (1988), and others, that public 
infrastructure'. deterioration in older cities, cities with an aging industrial base, has an 
important impact on urban economic development 
Explanation of coefficient magnitudes: 
The --magnitudes of the coefficient<; of the public infrastructure capital stock 
variables in the regression equations (7), (8) and (9) are reported in Table 3 above, Table 
A-1-5 and Table A-1-6 in Appendix A-1, respectively. The magnitudes are considerable, 
yet reasonable. They compare to, and tend to be a little larger than, those of other studies. 
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On the basis of Table A-1-6, increasing state and local public infrastructure capital stock 
on streets/highways by an amount of $100 per non-agricultural employee in 1988 would 
increase the average (for 5 years) annual growth rate of private non-agricultural 
employment by 0.008% in the 'Hi' group of states. This is a considerable effect, given 
that it is for a change in the average growth rate for five years. This compares to 
Munnell's (1990a) results. The estimated coefficient on public capital stock is 0.00008 
and is for state and local infrastructure capital on streets/highways in the 'Hi' group of 
states, for 5 years, starting from 1988. Munnell's estimated coefficient is 0.0002, for state 
and local public capital stock as a total, for 8 years starting from 1980. The difference 
between the two estimates is smaller than it seems. Her capital variable is measured as 
total public capital stock per capita The public capital stock variable in the current study 
is measured as public capital stock per non-farm employee. An increase of $100 per 
capita is more than an increase of $100 per non-farm employee. Population number is on 
the average twice non-farm employment. This makes Munnell's estimate about 50% 
smaller if her capital stock variable is measured as :per non-farm employee instead of per 
capita. Munnell's estimates are for total public capital. Therefore, the effects are averaged 
across types. Her failure to control for fixed effects means that her estimates are for the 
mean of the 48 states. Evidenc~ by previous studies and this study shows that when 
controlling for fixed effects the impact of public capital on growth becomes less 
,significant or insignificant. 
Table A-1-5 m Appendix A -1 shows that the coefficient of 
streets/highways and sewage for the 'Hi' group of states is 0.000578, which is higher than 
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the coefficient of 'strwgedu' of Table 3. This indicates that earmarking more public 
capital spending on streets/highways-sewage in a state from group 'Hi' would have a 
greater positive impact on growth than earmarking that increase in spending on 
streets/highways-sewage-education. The variable 'strwgedu' is picked by the 'stepwise' 
procedure when considering public capital for the mean state of the 48 states. However, 
as is apparent from above, when considering the 'Hi' states only, concentrating spending 
on streets/highways and sewage is more effective for non-farm employment growth (in 
the period of study) than spreading it over a wider range that includes education. 
However, this might be due to the fact the time period of the study is too short for 
increases in education capital to have effect on employment growth. Further, Table A-1-6 
indicates that the coefficient of the public capital stock variable is even larger if the type 
of public capital considered for the 'Hi' states is streets/highways. This estimated 
coefficient is 0.000766. However, it is significant at 10% level only, not 5%, and thus is 
not strong evidence. 
What do the results indicate about the relevant tax variable ? 
Table A-1-5 shows that the coefficient of 'bus.tax' is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The results indicate that, when making location decisions, 
firms consider taxes paid by businesses, not just total state and local tax revenue. As 
indicated in the literature review, previous evidence that examined the impact of the level 
of total state tax revenue on employment growth is mixed. The finding of this study is 
unique, because all of the previous studies that examined the effects of taxes on public 
capital stocks or public spending on regional economic development have used total state 
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and local tax revenue, or types of taxes such as property taxes, sales taxes, or rates as their 
tax variables. The result that 'bustax' is statistically significant and 'indtax' is not 
suggests that, when considering firm location decisions, firms give more weight to taxes 
paid by businesses and not to taxes that fall on individual income. This might be because 
the business tax bill is more relevant, as it relates to the potential business profitability at 
different locations. Taxes on businesses might have a more negative impact on 
employment growth because they repel new businesses, drive existing businesses out, or 
deter new branch openings. One of the possible reasons why taxes paid by individuals do 
not have a significant effect on employment growth might be that labor is usually less 
mobile than capital, and thus taxes on individuals might not have much effect on labor 
supply. The evidence found by this study, if confirmed by other evidence, is important for 
policy makers. This is because tax revenue generated from business taxes can hurt 
employment growth much more than if it is generated from non-business taxes. 
Calculation of the net effects of tax increases used to finance infrastructure 
increases: 
Estimation of the regression equations has so far indicated that the coefficient of 
the public capital stock variable is positive and statistically significant, and the coefficient 
of the tax variable is negative and statistically significant. Now we want to see what the 
results suggest about the net effect of a policy package of a tax increase to finance an 
increase in public infrastructure. 
Suppose that the state or local government increased business taxes 'bustax' and 
used the tax revenue generated from such a tax increase to finance an increase in 
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streets/highways and sewage. Suppose also that this is done in each of the 23 states of the 
'Hi' group in 1988. It is worth noting that calculation of net effects are not done for the 
rest of the states because· the coefficient of the public capital · stock variable is not 
significant for them, and thus it is not meaningful to build any calculations or conclusions 
on a coefficient that is not statistically different from zero. 
If 'bustax' was increased by 0.01, and the resulting tax revenue from such a tax 
increase is spent on state and local public infrastructure capital stock on streets/highways 
and sewage, then the net effects of this balanced.;.budget policy package on state and local 
private non-farm employment growth rate, by the end of a five-year period, are shown in 
Table 4. ( See Appendix A-2 for calculations). 
As shown in Table 4, the results suggest that, the net effect of a 0.01 increase in 
'bustax' used to finance an increase in streets/highways infrastructure capital sto.ck 'strhi' 
in each of the high growth states, in. 1988, would have resulted.in an increase in private 
annual average non-farm employment growth rate, for the years 1988 to 1993, for eight of 
those ,states, but a decrease,init in the wmaining,fifteen states. ·Toe negative effects of the 
above mentioned tax · increase outweigh the,- positive effects of the increase· in 
infrastructure capital stock financed by the tax revenue generated by the tax increase in 
fifteen· of the twenty three high growth states. Thus, the state private non-farm average 
annual employment growth rate falls in those fifteen states. Potential entrance into the 
state might be repelled, ilew firm openings might be deterred, and existing firms could be 
. . ~ 
driven out, because of the policy package. The positive effects of increases in streets and 
highways infrastructure capital stock outweigh the negative effects of tax increases, to 
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finance them, in eight of the twenty three high growth states. Thus, the private non-farm 
average annual employment growth rate rises. 
Table (4) 
Net effects of tax and public infrastructure capital increases 
State Net change in 
























However, this does not mean that a conclusion can be drawn, on the above 
mentioned net effects, that a policy package of tax increases to finance streets and 
highways in the high growth states in the mentioned period would have, on the average, 
resulted in a negative net effect. Two important points are to be noted. First, the above 
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calculations are made on the basis of 'bustax' as the tax variable. But the coefficient of 
this variable is statistically significant and of considerable, but not unreasonable, 
magnitude. This suggests that this variable is not the right one to be included in a policy 
package. To raise the same amount of revenue, non-business taxes are the right choice for 
policy makers. The above calculations are made on the basis of 'bustax' because it is the 
only tax variable that is statistically significant in the model. Of course, if it turned out 
that the net effect, on employment growth rate, of the tax increase and public capital 
increase is positive for all the high growth states, that would have been stronger evidence 
that the use of 'indtax' in the policy package would most likely yield positive net effects. 
However, indtax is not used in the experiment, and nothing can be concluded with 
confidence about the net effect if the non-business tax variable is used to generate the 
required revenue. No calculation for the net effect of a package that uses non-business 
taxes is possible within the results of this study, because it is not meaningful to build any 
calculations or draw any conclusions on a coefficient that is statistically not different 
from zero. 
Second, although, due to the dis-equilibrium-adjustment model framework used, 
the average change in the dependent variable is for a period of 5 years, this is still very 
short when compared to the length of life most infrastructure has. The long-run net effect 
of the same policy package discussed is likely to be considerably different. In the long 
run, indirect effects of public infrastructure are likely to be substantial. Such indirect 
effects might not be captured by a coefficient that measures- short-run or initial effects. It 
is worth noting that the increase in the tax rate is for one year, 1988 only. There is no 
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increase assumed for succeeding years. Thus, it seems that there is every reason for 
capital to have a positive effect in the long run, because the attractiveness of the area is 
improved, while the tax rate is set back to its previous level. The negative effect of the tax 
increase would last for a maximum of 11 years. (Bartik 1996.) That is the maximum. The 
positive effect of infrastructure increases would last for decades. 
However, on the basis of our results, the most important point is that, the 
calculations are based on 'bustax' as the tax variable. But that is not the tax choice for 
policy makers in this situation. Non-business taxes are the choice for policy makers as 
suggested by the study, for the period of data and the high growth states. 
Cost per job: 
One other simulation can be done to look at the effect of taxes alone, without 
regard to public capital. Suppose that a general 0.01 cut is made in business taxes, 
'bustax', in 1988, in each of the high growth states. What do the results of the estimated 
regression equations suggest about the effect of that tax competition action? On the basis 
of the explanations in the above section and Appendix A-2, the results of Table A-1-5, 
indicate that this tax cut would result in an increase of 0.0094942 in the annual average 
private non-farm employment growth rate for 5 years. For New Hampshire, e.g., this 
would cause an increase in private non-farm employment by 0.0094942 x 5 x 529,000 = 
25,112. The tax revenue lost, in New Hampshire, is$ 12,340,000. Therefore, the cost per 
job is $ 12,340,000/ 25,112 = $ 491. Table 5 shows the similar cost per job, as well as 
the number of jobs created, for each of the 23 states. 
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Table 5 
Cost per Job and Jobs Created for a 0.01 Business Tax Cut 
State Jobs created Cost per job 
NH 25,112 491 
VT 12,153 436 
MA 148,394 486 
RI 21,789 444 
CT 79,514 573 
NY 388,598 513 
NJ 173,743 634 
PA 239,348 537 
OH 223,161 530 
IL 242,007 551 
MI 181,291 557 
WI 102,965 507 
MN 96,271 507 
MO 107,236 496 
KS 49,132 463 
DE 15,855 768 
MD 99,784 430 
VA 131,637 450 
GA 136,621 493 
FL 240,536 415 
co 68,168 455 
NV 25,539 349 
WA 92,236 475 
Other Variables: 
With regard to the rest of the explanatory variables, the results are in general 
consistent with what theory suggests and what the theoretical model has hypothesized. 
The results of each of regression equations (7), (8) and (9) reported in Tables 3, A-1-5 
and A-1-6 show that the coefficient of the variable 'wage', which is a measure of the cost 
of labor, has a negative sign and is statistically significant. This indicates that the cost of 
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labor is one of the factors that have significant effects on firm location and employment 
growth. 
Including the variables u, grad and transfer, one at a time, in regression equation 
(7), which is one of the besta.fit equations, gave the results of tables A-1-7, A-1-8, and A-
1-9 in Appendix A-1. These results show that the coefficients of u and grad are positive 
(although the latter is positive for the low-growth states only), and thus consistent with 
the_ expected signs, suggesting that the· availability and quality of labor are likely to have 
positive impacts on state economic growth, in the period covered by the study. This is in 
spite of the fact that, OD. -the basis of the reasonably fitted models, such 'eOefficients are not 
statistically significant. One po~sible explanation for insignificance of the coefficient of 
'grad' might be that it measures higher education while businesses, especially small 
firms, are interested in medium-level vocational skills. and trades. The backwash effect is 
'i 
another possible explanation. A considerable number of the pe9ple who attain high 
,· : 
education levels in the low growth states move · to high growth states. Another very 
plausible reason.might.be .$at.such a iµeasure is not a good measure oLthe. quality of 
labor. -
Similarly, the coefficient of the variable 'transfer', although not statistically 
significant in the best fitted models, has a negative sign as expected. Apparently, this is 
because the data for this variable is constructed in such a manner that it includes AFDC+ 
MEDICAID paid b)'. the state (as its share, not including the federal share). This makes 
this variable endogenous to the state, since it is financed from the state's own resources. 
Therefore, on the basis of how it is viewed from a firm's perspective, its coefficient is 
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expected to have a negative sign. This is because being financed from the state's own 
resources means that an increase in 'transfer' implies higher taxes or less state revenue 
available to other public resources, and/or because it decreases labor supply through its 
negative impact on the incentive to work. 
The coefficient of the variable 'energ' is negative and statistically significant. This 
suggests that it is strongly related to firm location and private economic activity since it 
comprises a considerable portion of the cost of production for many types of businesses 
and thus affects firm profitability at a location. 
The coefficient of the variable 'urban' has a negative sign and is statistically 
significant. As a measure of the size of the market and thus market demand it was 
expected to have a positive sign. One explanation of this negative sign is that urban can 
also be a measure of other factors that are negatively related to the dependent variable. 
For example, it might be an indicator of congestion, which might have a negative impact 
on employment growth due to the various negative effects of congestion, extending from 
crime, to competition in the use of public services. Increases in urbanization and the size 
of urban population might also be associated with pollution. The variable 'urban' might 
also be a measure of land cost, whereby a high urban population means high costs of 
land, and thus high costs of production, especially that the cost of land is not directly 
measured in our regression equations. Therefore, it is not of much surprise that the sign of 
the estimated coefficient for 'urban' is negative. This is similar to the results of other 
studies which have found that their variable 'population density', which is used for 
measuring market demand has the unexpected negative sign. 
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The coefficient of the variable 'temp' is, as expected, positive and statistically 
significant. A warm climate suggests lower energy costs. However, other possible 
explanations might be that warmer weather indicates greater availability and lower costs 
of labor, greater population and thus local market demand, especially for services, and 
might as well indicate certain geographic locations where land costs are low and natural 
resources are cheaper. In other words, it may capture some of the factors that are already 
represented by other variables in the regression equations, as well as other factors not 





This study examines the effects of state and local public infrastructure capital 
stocks and taxes on regional economic development. It does so in a framework that uses, 
among other explanatory variables, state and local public capital stock estimates, a new 
type of data, as well as measures of taxes that are consistent with a proper specification of 
the theoretical model. Estimation procedures are chosen to avoid and correct for the 
estimation problems that have plagued much of the previous empirical research. 
The results indicate that, when controlling for region-specific unobservable 
characteristics, the estimated positive effects of state and local total public stocks on 
employment growth became statistically less significant. This supports Holtz-Eakin's 
(1992) argument that, when controlling for region- or state-specific fixed effects, the 
estimated effect of state and local public capital stocks on economic activity become 
insignificant or at least less significant. This suggests that the results of previous studies 
that failed to include such controls might have exaggerated the effect of public capital, 
especially total public capital, on economic growth. 
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Introducing slope dummy variables has indicated that the slope parameter for 
streets/highways & sewage , or streets/highways, public infrastructure capital stock is 
significantly different between the two groups of the 48 contiguous states: group 'Hi' 
which includes the first 23 states that have higher levels of growth, measured by per 
capita income in 1988, and group 'Lo', 25 states, which are the rest of the states. This 
indicates that the notion that the region or state-specific unobserved characteristics can all 
be controlled by intercept dummy variables assuming that slope parameters are the same 
for all cross-sections or observations does not seem appropriate. 
Introducing slope dummy variables has indicated that the estimated effects of 
streets/highways & sewerage, or streets/highways public infrastructure capital stocks are 
positive and statistically significant for group 'Hi', the high growth states, and not 
significant for group 'Lo', the low growth states. The results of this study support Eberts 
and Dalenberg's (1988) assertion that public infrastructure in older cities, cities with an 
aging industrial base, has an important impact on urban economic development. This 
suggests that, when assuming that slope parameters are the same, results were averages of 
the effects of policies across all the states, which might differ in their hierarchies of 
needs. 
Calculations of the net effects, on average annual private non-farm employment 
growth rate, of business tax increases to finance increases in state and local public 
infrastructure capital stock on streets/highways and sewage in the grown states indicate 
that such net effects are negative for fifteen of the high growth states, and positive for 
eight of them. However, this does not constitute a basis against the policy of tax increases 
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to finance infrastructure increases or improvements, because the mentioned calculations 
are made on the basis of business taxes as the tax variable, since it is the only statistically 
significant tax variable in the model. The tax variable of choice for policy makers should 
be non-business tax, because the results indicate that such a variable does not have a 
significant negative impact on employment growth. Besides, the net effects of tax 
increases to finance increases in public infrastructure capital are likely to be positive for 
most of the high growth states in the long run. 
The results also indicate that when disaggregated to types, the estimated effects of 
state and local public capital stock become more significant and considerable. This 
suggests that the estimated effects of total state and local public capital stock are averages 
across the effects of types that are likely to differ in signs and significance and 
magnitudes. Further, the results indicate that the public capital types that have significant 
estimated effects are infrastructure types. 
The results of the study suggest that, when taking location decisions, firms give 
more weight to interstate or inter-jurisdictional differentials in taxes paid by businesses 
' 
than to taxes that are paid by individuals. 
Policy Implications: 
• It is useful to policy makers to have evidence that suggests to them what types of 
state and local public capital stock are more effective for regional economic 
development, and for what region, state or jurisdiction. The evidence provided by this 
study suggests that streets/highways and sewerage public infrastructure capital stocks are 
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more effective for employment growth in the high growth states, at least for the period 
covered by the study. 
• It is important for policy makers to have evidence with regard to which taxes are 
least harmful to employment growth, given a certain amount of required revenue. 
Evidence provided by this study indicates that raising an additional amount of 
revenue would cause less harm to employment growth if it is raised by taxes that are 
paid by individuals (households) than if it is made by taxes that are paid by 
businesses. However, since such apportionment of taxes to business and non-
business taxes is unique and only done for this study, more evidence is needed for 
other time periods. 
• The results suggest that tax cuts are not effective for employment growth in some of 
the high growth states. Non-business tax increases to finance increases in public 
infrastructure on streets and highways are likely to have positive impact on 
employment growth in those states. However, specific tax incentives need to be 
considered individually. 
Limitations: 
Having specified a model as the correct model, there are four broad types of 
errors (Gujarati, 1955); omission of a relevant variable, inclusion of an extraneous 
variable, choice of wrong functional form and measurement errors. In this study, all 
possible caution has been taken to avoid such errors. A consistent theoretical framework 
is constructed on the basis of relevant economic theory. Data is processed using proper 
definitions, formulae and software. 
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• Capital stock data used is Holtz-Eakin (1993) estimates for the year 1988. So, it 
might be an advantage of this study that it has used Holtz-Eakin data, because his 
estimates were made later than Munnell's estimates and he has commented on some 
errors in Munnell's estimates. However, since such estimates are still constructed by an 
individual effort and not a government statistics entity, measurement errors are not an 
impossibility. 
• State sales tax revenues for 1988 are apportioned, for the purpose of this study, to 
business and non-business taxes using Ring (1989) index for the year 1979. There is a 
very wide range of differences between the Ring index and other indices, including the 
ACIR index, (which seems primitive and based on Fryman(1969) index.) 
State property tax revenue for 1988 is apportioned to businesses and non-
businesses using the ratios of 1983, the most recent year for which data for state property 
tax revenue is available in types, as explained in the Data section. 
• The results indicate that the variable 'urban' is not successful as a measure of the 
market demand, as explained in Chapter IV. A considerable number of empirical studies 
indicate that economists have used population density as a measure of market demand, 
and have consistently run into the same problem of encountering the wrong sign. 
• The study is cross-sectional. The number of observations is 48. A greater 
number of observations means more degrees of freedom. That allows more precision, as 
well as the inclusion of more independent variables, since dummy variables use up 
degrees of freedom. Expanding the study across time and/or jurisdictional levels could 
be done upon availability of state and local public capital stock data. 
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Research Implications and Further Research: 
• The results of this study generally indicate that the significance of state and local 
public capital stock becomes more clear, whether significant or not, the more state and 
local public capital stock data is broken to types and the more cross-sections on 
individual states or jurisdictions are considered. That might be the direction of research, 
specifically more evidence is needed to support, qualify or refute the attempt of this study 
with regard to the use of slope dummy variables which gave the results that a certain type 
or types of public infrastructure capital seem to be significant for the grown states and not 
the other states. 
• The other unique contribution of the study that needs to be tested by further 
empirical work is the classification of taxes to business and non-business taxes. Probably 
more accurate methods can be adopted to perform such apportionment, and more types of 
taxes can be apportioned. There are indexes available for business and they might be 
used and tested with regard to their significance in business and location decisions. 
• Further research can endeavor to find a better measure of market demand. Neither 
urban population, nor population density is a good measure of market demand. 
• Further research can also be carried with a greater number of observations to 
provide more accuracy, and allow more explanatory variables and dummy variables to be 
included in the estimation. 
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Appendix A-1 











including 'u', 'grad' and 'transfer'. 
Title 
Results of Regression Equation (1) 
Results of Regression Equation (2) 
Results of Regression Equation (4) 
Results of Regression Equation (6) 
Results of Regression Equation (8) 
Results of Regression Equation (9) 
Results of Regression Equation (7) Including the Variable 'u'. 
Results of Regression Equation (7) Including the Variable 'grad'. 
Results of Regression Equation (7) Including the Variable 'transfer'. 
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Table A-1-1 
Results of Regression Equation (1) 
Variable Estimated Coefficient Standard Error T-ratio p-value 
pubcap 0.00011779 0.00006696 1.759 0.086 
bus tax -0.52933000 1.06900000 -0.495 0.623 
ind tax 12.83600000 17.29000000 0.742 0.462 
energ -0.41116000 0.16990000 -2.419 0.020 
transfer -0.3525800 0.082160 -4.291 0.000 




Results of Regression Equation (2) 
Variable Estimated Coefficient Standard Error T-ratio p-value 
MWD 1.8946 0.3800 4.985 0.000 
SD 1.2598 0.4049 3.111 0.004 
WD 3.1106 0.4021 7.735 0.000 
pubcap 0.000062819 0.00004767 1.318 0.196 
bus tax -1.848600 0.7359 -2.512 0.016 
ind tax -9.695200 10.09 -0.9608 0.343 
wage -0.268290 0.1217 -2.204 0.034 
energ -0.292350 0.1304 -2.242 0.031 
urban -0.013303 0.005826 -2.283 0.028 
temp 1.664600 3.033 0.5488 0.586 
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Table A-1-3 
Results of Regression Equation ( 4) 
Variable Estimated Coefficient Standard Error T-ratio p-value 
MWD 1.8536 0.3807 4.869 0.000 
SD 1.3121 0.3993 3.286 ·0.002 
WD 3.1362 0.3954 7.931 0.000 
bus tax -1.7309 0.6285 -2.754 0.009 
ind tax -9.3850 9.928 -0.9453 0.351 
wage -0.25465 0.1184 -2.150 0.038 
en erg -0.28878 0.1293 -2.234 0.032 
urban -0.011302 0.006189 -1.826 0.076 
temp 0.049391 0.02433 2.030 0.050 
strwgedu 0.000069372 0.00004699 1.476 0.148 
constant 1.5853 3.017 0.5254 0.602 
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Table A-1-4 
Results of Regression Equation· (6) 
Variable Estimated Coefficient Standard Error T-ratio p-value 
MWD 1.7724 0.3693 4.800 0.000 
SD 1.3805 0.3742 3.689 0.001 
WD 3.2237 0.3792 8.502 0.000 
bus tax -1.3971 0.5372 -2.601 0.013 
wage -0.30560 0.1171 -2.610 0.013 
en erg -0.38889 0.1286 -3.024 0.005 
urban -0.016574 0.006191 -'2.677 0.011 
temp 0.06431 0.02332 2.757 0.009 
strwedlo 0.000053328 0.00004442 1.200 0.238 
strwedhi 0.000095684 0.00004777 2.003 0.053 
constant 1.1755 2.797 0.4202 0.677 
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Table A-1-5 
Results of Regression Equation (8) 
Variable Estimated Coefficient Standard Error T-ratio p-value 
MWD 1.8450 0.3678 5.016 0.000 
SD 1.3880 0.3768 3.684 0.001 
WD 3.2811 0.3788 8.661 0.000 
bustax -0.94942 0.3898 -2.436 0.020 
wage -0.27902 0.1161 -2.404 0.021 
energ -0.42497 0.1241 -3.425 0.001 
urban -0.01931 · 0.005718. -3.377 0.002 
temp 0.063742 0.02346 2.718 0.010 
strswahi 0.000057885 0.00002843 2.036 0.049 
constant 1.8420 2.744 0.6712 0.506 
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Table A-1-6 
Results of Regression Equation (9) 
Variable Estimated Coefficient Standard Error T-ratio p-value 
MWD 1.8570 0.3735 4.971 0.000 
SD 1.4128 0.3827 3.692 0.001 
WD 3.3286 0.3876 8.588 0.000 
bus tax -0.93003 0.3959 -2.349 0.024 
wage -0.27934 0.1190 -2.348 0.024 
en erg -0.42644 0.1282 -3.327 ·0.002 
urban -0.017716 0.00564 -3.141 . 0.003 
temp 0.059415 0.02353 2.525 0.016 
strhi 0.000076619 0.00004504 1.701 0.097 
constant 2.1283 2.800 0.7602 0.452 
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TableA-1-7 
Results of Regression Equation (7) Including the Variable 'u' 
Variable Estimated Coefficient Standard Error T-ratio p-value 
MWD 2.1065 0.3867 5.448 0.000 
SD 1.7557 0.4050 4.335 0.000 
WD 3.6138 0.3974 9.094 0.000 
bustax -0.89580 0.4276 -2.095 0.043 
wage -0.39708 0.1270 -3.127 0.003 
energ -0.37171 0.1466 -2.536 0.015 
urban -0.015650 0.0061 -2.576 0.014 
strwedhi 0.000033225 0.00002326 1.428 0.161 
u 0.030161 0.08782 0.3434 0.733 
constant 7.5120 1.982 3.790 0.001 
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Table A-1-8 
Results of Regression Equation (7) Including the Variable 'grad' 
Variable Estimated Coefficient Standard Error T-ratio p-value 
MWD 1.7248 0.3761 4.586 0.000 
SD 1.4086 0.3752 · 3.754 0.001 
WD 3.1880 0.3837 8.308 0.000 
bus tax -0.93369 0.3871 -2.412 0.021 
wage -0.27682 0.1162 -2.382 0.022 
energ -0.38670 0.1289 -3.000 0.005 
urban -0.018393 0.0057(>~ : -::ll91 .. 0.003 
temp 0.066939 "0.02342 2.858 0.007 
strwedhi . 0.00009024 0.00004336 2.081 0.044 
gradlo. 0.023049 0.01897 . 1.215 0.232 
constant 0.63859 2.924 0.2184 0.828 
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. Table A-1-9 
· Results of Regression Equation (7) Including the variable 'transfer' 
Variable Estimated Coefficient. Standard Error T-'ratio p-value 
MWD 1.7864 0.3785 4.720 0.000 
-
SD 1.2959 0.4000 · 3.240 0.003 
WO . 3.1754 0.4198 7.564 0.000 
bus tax -0.89428 0.4032 -2.218 0.033 
wage -0.28684 0.1177 -2.444 0.001 
energ -0.43286 0.1257 -3.444 •.. 0.001 
urban -0.018107 0;006211 -2.915 0.006 
·, l"' ~.> \ ! .'. . ·. ~:\ =·'(~ :, .. ;.,~2 .. ; !.. ,_.(~ : _; i -· ~:,. -. i . • : : ~- ··- . ~ 
temp 0:057076 · 0.02644 2;158 ·0.037 
strwedhi 0.000045755··· 0.00002182 2.097 0.043 
transfer -0.036619 0.06062 -0.6041 0549 
constant· 2.7165 3.061 0.8876 0.380 
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Appendix A-2 
Calculation of the Net Effects of Increases in 
Streets/highways and the Tax Increases to Finance Them. 
This Appendix outlines the calculation of the net effects,.on employment growth, 
· of the balanced-budget policy package experiment the results of which are shown in 
Table 4 in chapter V._ The calcul~tions are made for the most grown 23 states because the 
coefficient of streets/highways is statistically significant for that cross-section of states. 
Table A-1-6 shows that the coefficient of 'strhi' is 0.000076619. The variable 
'strhi' is defmed as the dollar amount of state and local public infrastructure capital stock 
on streets/highways per one non-farm private employee in the high growth states in 1988. 
Therefore, the coefficient measures the change that occurs in the dependent variable 
'empgrow' if 'strhi' is increased by one unit. One unit here is $1 per private non-farm 
employee. In other wo~ds; if -~kite 'an'.tfo~'al-pubiic capital stock on streets/highways is 
increased by-$ I' per pri~ate non-farm empfoyee in the mean state of the most 23 gro-wn 
states, in 1988, the state average growth rate of private non-farm employment for the 
years 1988-1993 would have increased by 0;000076619. 
Suppose 'bustax' was increased by 0.01, in 1988. By the definition of 'bustax' as the ratio 
of business tax revenue to corporate profit~ this means an increase in tax revenue by 0.01 
times corporate profit. To illustrate by an example, for New Hampshire this would 
generate revenue of 0.01 x 1,234,000,000 = $ 12,340,000. Dividing this amount by 
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nonfarm employment forNew Hampshire gives 12,340,000/529,000 = $ 23.327,032. 
This is the amount by which 'strhi' would increase. Thus 'empgrow' would rise by 
0.000076619 x 23.327 ,032 = 0.0017872939. By the end of the fifth year, 'empgrow' · 
would rise by more than 5 x 0.0017872939 = 0.0089364693. But the tax increase would 
cause 'empgrow' to fall by 0.0093003. · The net effect is thus 0.0089364693 ·· -
0.0093003 = -0.00036306 , which is the corresponding net effect for New Hampshire as 
shown in Table 4 in C,hapter V. The net effects for the other states are calculated the same 
way. The net effect, calculated for five years period, is positive for eight states and 
negative for the remaining fifteen states. (Refer to Chapter V for the discussion on how 





State mwd sd wd wage u energ urban.st sw ed pub pop transfer temp grad elect emgrol emgro2 emgro3 nfam bustax indiv dl d2 
NH O O O 9.97 2.4 9.76 56.3 2510 594 1029 5104 1083 4.44 82.4 39.1 24.24 0.3246 -0.1312 -0.9941 529 0.34626 36432 1 0 
VT O O O 9.47 2.8 9.55 23.2 3803 790 1304 6443 550 6.27 81.2 46.6 23.73 0.7884 0.5410 0.1045 256 0.39303 67610 1 0 
MA O O O 10.40 3.3 8.94 90.6 1902 1822 1328 7029 5980 10.64 81.8 43.2 22.86 -0.6686 -1.1818 -1.8617 3126 0.32769 71220 1 0 
RI O O O 8.64 3.1 8.54 92.6 2085 898 946 5512 996 11.37 82.1 49.5 23.27 -0.5324 -0.8900 -1.2540 459 0.38343 70096 1 0 
CT O O O 10.78 3.0 10.01 92.6 2448 1087 1280 6598 3272 7.09 85.0 27.8 24.55 -0.9543 -1.3292 ~1.7649 1675 0.40347 53878 1 0 
NY O O O 10.43 4.2 9.09 91.2 2679 2161 1620 9445 17941 16.47 83.1 31.7 25.09 -0.5448 -0.7465 -1.0686 8186 0.74064 88014 1 0 
NJ O O O 10.86 3.8 8.10 100.0 2253 1083 1217 6148 7712 6.39 84.5 19.3 24.97 -0.1943 -0.4753 -0.9256 3660 0.37761 58535 1 0 
PA O O O 10.33 5.1 7.29 84.8 2215 919 1347 6131 11846 6.75 84.4 32.8 20.92 0.5797 0.4965 0.3264 5042 0.31918 56766 1 0 
OH 1 0 0 12.00 6.0 7.18 78.9 2346 1158 1297 6454 10799 7.88 83.9 27.1 16.90 1.5512 1.2975 0.9144 4701 0.34947 60083 1 0 
IL 1 o O 10.98 6.8 7.56 82.5 2493 1272 1467 6906 11390 6.51 84.7 27.4 21.49 1.3561 1.1671 0,9054 5098 0.45317 51247 1 0 
MI 1 0 0 13.31 7.6 7.39 79.9 2113 1154 1674 6668 9218 9.02 76.7 27.0 19.40 1.5599 1.3979 0.9736 3819 0.48764 68917 1 0 
WI 1 O O 10.61 4.3 7.49 66.5 3196 1319 1583 6599 4822 8.35 79.9 33.5 16.14 2.3709 2.3379 2.1590 2169 0.39635 76422 1 0 
MN 1 0 0 10.59 4.0 7.35 66.6 3397 1349 1840 8559 4296 9.42 80.6 32.9 15.79 2.2795 2.1977 2.0398 2028 0.47613 71761 1 0 
MO 1 0 0 10.24 5.7 7.58 66.0 2335 987 1135 5789 5082 4.74 89.0 30.9 18.94 1.5904 1.5182 1.1872 2259 0.33777 49533 1 0 
KS 1 0 0 10.24 4.8 6.64 53.4 3598 1233 1441 7494 2462 5.10 92.8 32.7 19.22 2.1511 2.0093 1.8287 1035 0.72915 48552 1 0 
DE O 1 0 11.49 3.2 7.98 65.9 3084 943 2087 8015 648 5.19 85.6 32.6 19.56 1.3296 1.0830 0.8985 334 0.29058 44616 1 0 
MD O 1 0 10.71 4.5 7.97 92.9 2611 1297 1615 7853 4658 6.08 87.2 23.2 17.13 0.5460 0.3652 0.0196 2102 0.35689 67631 1 0 
VA O 1 0 9.37 3.9 7.66 72.2 2575 849 1213 5876 6037 4.25 87.4 25.1 16.65 1.4701 1.3601 1.0497 2773 0.24893 56978 l 0 
GA O 1 0 8.65 5.8 7.55 64.8 2091 1517 1246 6458 6316 5.27 88.0 18.9 18.29 2.5062 2.1534 1.5741 2878 0.40043 54414 1 0 
FL O 1 0 8.39 5.0 9.29 90.8 1669 1375 1046 5775 12306 4.04 90.2 19.4 20.70 2.4628 2.2956 1.9362 5067 0.59752 37775 1 0 
COO O 1 10.38 6.4 7.12 81.7 2190 1917 1747 7585 3262 5.43 88.2 30.7 17.33 3.6037 3.4165 3.0824 1436 0.53746 56915 1 0 
NV O O 1 10.08 5.2 7.71 82.6 2697 1039 1182 7245 1075 3.13 91.9 12.5 15.94 5.6655 5.4580 4.5526 538 0.58192 24298 1 0 
WA O O 1 11.90 6.2 6.63 81.6 2782 4008 1818 10717 4640 7.85 79.2 26.4 10.13 2.7607 2.8953 3.0216 1943 0.68269 45079 1 0 
CA O O l 10.80 5.3 7.90 95.7 1496 1527 1125 6283 28464 8.85 79.1 21.0 23.42 0.4140 0.1075 -0.0620 12103 0.55804 56842 0 1 
ME O O O 9.31 3.8 8.00 36.1 2689 863 1114 5515 1204 7.47 78.8 27.5 19.65 0.4285 0.1866 -0.2770 527 0.39724 73468 0 I 
IN 1 O O 11.00 5.3 5.99 68.1 2223 873 1631 5625 5492 5.34 85.5 30.9 16.53 2.1596 2.1018 1.8674 2396 0.35777 59569 0 1 
IA 1 0 0 10.56 4.5 6.81 43.4 4190 1215 1592 7954 2768 5.74 86.7 40.1 17.59 2.3210 2.2407 2.0477 1156 0.62880 57307 0 1 
ND 1 0 0 8.36 4.8 5.86 38.4 5073 895 1908 9095 655 7.60 84.4 40.4 16.88 2.3341 2.3276 2.0914 257 0.95332 36034 0 1 
SD 1 0 0 8.09 3.9 7.22 29.1 5731 1230 1550 9060 698 4.85 86.3 35.0 17.56 3.7442 3.7658 3.7040 266 0.89290 35728 0 1 
NE 1 0 0 9.38 3.6 6.86 47.6 3804 4753 1487 10905 1571 4.92 87.9 35.1 15.54 2.4529 2.4639 2.2005 688 0.63025 50989 0 1 
WV O I O 10.81 9.9 5.73 36.5 4259 468 1306 7100 1830 4.95 85.7 26.2 14.10 1.7393 1.7082 1.3760 610 0.47161 44646 0 1 
NC O 1 0 8.12 3.6 8.57 55.4 1722 1070 1126 5182 6481 4.03 88.5 24.8 18.04 2.1149 1.9911 1.6867 2987 0.34586 60684 0 1 
SC O 1 0 8.30 4.5 7.97 60.5 1457 1230 1257 5137 3412 3.39 91.6 21.3 16.40 1.8709 1.7575 1.6377 1449 0.42873 51934 0 1 
KY O 1 0 10.16 7.9 7.26 46.1 3322 810 1334 6581 3680 5.07 87.0 20.5 15.08 2.5071 2.4448 2.3007 1382 0.39238 48644 0 1 
TN O 1 0 8.96 5.8 7.70 67.1 2407 1644 1175 6403 4822 4.52 90.9 23.0 16.19 2.6067 2.4909 2.1818 2092 0.49442 34909 0 1 
AL O 1 0 8.95 7.2 6.55 67.5 2282 804 1346 5926 4024 2.66 91.3 25.5 16.34 2.1017 2.0350 1.9528 1559 0.30864 40931 0 1 
MS O 1 0 7.83 8.4 6.98 30.5 2837 529 987 5586 2580 3.92 92.4 20.3 18.20 2.6487 2.7903 2.2706 896 0.68051 33617 0 1 
AR O 1 0 8.07 7.7 7.28 39.7 2244 570 1255 5143 2343 4.45 92.4 20.1 18.76 3.0743 3.0225 2.8222 865 0.39154 44180 0 1 
LA O 1 0 10.94 10.9 5.06 69.2 3207 961 1336 7379 4289 5.73 90.6 23.0 17.30 2.3223 2.1964 1.8762 1512 0.85937 28904 0 1 
OK O 1 0 10.35 6.7 6.46 58.8 2419 1088 1501 6437 3167 6.07 93.4 28.0 16.20 2.1547 2.0711 1.9561 1132 0.66083 41942 0 1 
TX O 1 0 9.97 7.3 5.49 81.3 2295 1590 1553 6641 16667 4.09 ,95.1 21.9 16.58 2.6686 2.5199 2.3048 6678 0.64924 36435 0 1 
MT O O 1 10.68 6.8 6.97 24.2 5299 638 1596 9221 800 5.40 83.3 38.1 12.09 3.1273 3.1093 2.8722 283 1.07963 34798 0 1 
ID O O 1 10.00 5.8 7.20 20.0 3272 447 1404 6175 986 3.38 90.2 21.8 10.84 4.5675 4.7503 4.6019 349 0.44736 52640 0 I 
WY O O I 10.27 6.3 5.96 29.2 7381 1435 3221 15009 465 3.48 82.2 22.7 12.82 2.1958 2.3314 2.1310 189 2.17794 14224 0 1 
NM O O I 8.87 7.8 7.65 48.9 3015 937 1870 7322 1490 4.32 92.5 21.1 21.75 3.3553 3.0774 2.7025 548 1.14700 38636 0 I 
AZ O O 1 9.85 6.3 9.70 76.4 2364 2408 1774 8044 3535 2.47 105.9 23.7 21.74 3.3369 2.9966 2.2593 1419 0.81634 50995 0 1 
UT O O I 10.11 4.9 6.68 77.4 2592 2557 2012 8634 1689 3.40 92.2 40.2 18.40 4.6686 4.5165 4.1853 660 0.60417 67539 0 1 
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Dec. 1997. 
